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No. 9, September 1983

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2 December 1983

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 9, September 1983

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EDITORIAL LAUDS SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES, HITS U.S. POLICIES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 83 (signed to press 22 Aug 83) pp 3-6

[Article: "Justifying the Hopes of the People"]

[Text] The next session of the UN General Assembly, the 38th, will begin in New York on 20 September. The session is beginning at a crucial moment in the development of international relations, at a time of exceedingly dangerous escalation of tension through the fault of Washington politicians. The confrontation between two lines in world politics--the line of preserving and consolidating peace and the line of undermining its bases--is forcing more and more states, politicians and statesmen and increasingly broad segments of the public in various countries to become resolutely and actively involved in the struggle to defend peace and to prevent nuclear war.

The main center of opponents of peace and mutually beneficial cooperation by states is constantly growing more distinct. It is the U.S. administration, representing groups with clearly defined imperial ambitions, people who are once again trying to establish the notorious "Pax Americana," are preaching the cult of violence in international relations and are building up the military potential of the United States and of NATO in general at an unprecedented rate.

At the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly last year, Washington spokesmen voted against a resolution calling upon all UN members to conclude, as soon as possible, a world treaty on nonaggression in international relations, a draft of which was submitted to the United Nations by the USSR as early as 1976. In addition to Washington, another 14 states voted against the resolution (12 NATO countries--with the exception of Greece, Denmark and Iceland--and Israel and Japan) and thereby went against the overwhelming majority, the 119 delegations supporting the resolution. These delegations stressed that the prohibition of the use of force or threats of force as instruments of international policy is particularly important now that the Reagan Administration has set out to attain military superiority and has begun work on an unprecedented arms buildup program.

Soviet peace proposals, designed primarily to curb the arms race and eliminate the threat of nuclear war, and the initiative and consistent nature of Soviet

diplomatic behavior in the United Nations have already led to the conclusion of several important international treaties and agreements, including the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the ban on nuclear tests in the air, in space and under water, the ban on the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor, the ban on the development, production and accumulation of bacteriological (or biological) and toxin weapons and the agreement on their destruction, and the ban on the military or other hostile use of means of influencing the environment.

On the basis of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Government, the United Nations adopted documents with a tremendous positive effect on the entire international situation, promoting the heightened activity and consolidation of antimilitarist forces in the world arena, giving people hope and strengthening their belief that peace will triumph over war. These documents include a declaration adopted at the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe.

The support of the Soviet peace initiatives by the overwhelming majority of states, which voted for their adoption and their embodiment in UN documents, testifies to their pertinence in the resolution of the urgent problems disturbing all people, as Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, remarked in his speech at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in summer 1983.

The items included on the agenda of the 38th session at the request of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are just as consistent with the desires of the world's people. In particular, the Soviet Union has proposed the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests and their total prohibition, the institution of measures to strengthen the security of states not possessing nuclear weapons, the provision of such states with effective international safeguards against the use of nuclear weapons or threats of their use, the prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states which do not possess these weapons at the present time and the prohibition of the development and production of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, such as radiological weapons, for example. The USSR also believes that a world conference on disarmament should be convened, that military budgets should be reduced and that nuclear-free zones should be established in Northern Europe, in Africa and in the Middle East. These attempts to curb the arms race, primarily the race for nuclear arms, will be the central topic of discussion at the current session.

Another item on the agenda is an appeal to the nuclear powers to follow the Soviet Union's example and pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. The USSR made this pledge on a unilateral basis in June 1982, announcing it from the rostrum of the second special UN General Assembly session on disarmament. At that time it also called upon other nuclear powers to follow its example. It is clear that this kind of move by nuclear states, especially the United States, with gigantic nuclear arsenals would be tantamount to a virtual ban on the use of nuclear weapons. But Washington proved in a published directive document of the military leadership that the escalation of conflicts to the

point of nuclear war is still a major element of American military strategy. The United States took a new step in the buildup of first-strike nuclear weapons when Congress allocated several billion dollars this July for the production of the first group of MX missiles.

Various forums which met in 1983 to discuss ways of curtailing the arms race, including the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, demonstrated the further intensification of the struggle between the two lines in world politics. The unconstructive behavior of U.S. delegates again impeded the productive discussion of urgent security problems. For example, the Soviet Union submitted a draft document entitled "The Basic Provisions of the Total and Universal Test Ban Treaty" to the Committee on Disarmament for examination and preparation for discussion at the current session, in accordance with the resolution of the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly. But the obstructionist line of the United States, to which it has adhered since the time when it unilaterally broke off the Soviet-Anglo-American talks on this matter in 1980 and announced its decision last year not to resume them, the document has never been discussed at length. According to the apt definition of Charman H. Jack of the UN Special Committee of Nongovernment Organizations on Disarmament Affairs, in this matter the U.S. administration has "hemmed and hawed and expressed displeasure whenever the discussion in the United Nations turns to nuclear issues."

The creation of a special working group to plan ways of preventing nuclear war, which was proposed in the Geneva committee by the Soviet Union and several other peaceful states, has remained unaccomplished for the same reason. It has also been turned over to the UN General Assembly session for discussion. One important way of eliminating the nuclear threat would be a freeze on nuclear arsenals, and this is an idea which has won the most widespread support in the world. It is no secret that the Soviet Union regards a freeze on U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals as an important step in the curtailment of the arms race, and this step is also being advocated by the antinuclear movement in the United States and several other countries. Furthermore, the Soviet Government proposed that this freeze be made more effective and more inclusive by appealing to the governments of the United States, England, France and the PRC for a quantitative and qualitative freeze on the nuclear arsenals of all nuclear powers.

The 38th session will also consider the Soviet proposal of a ban on the deployment of weapons of any type in outer space and the prevention of an arms race in space. The world public feels that it is important not to allow the arms race to be carried out to space and is particularly disturbed by the Reagan Administration's plans to test various types of antimissile weapons in space, including lasers.

Washington's plans to update its chemical arsenal are equally disturbing. The American delegate in the Committee on Disarmament has repeatedly declared that the United States supposedly wants a ban on these weapons, but it was the position taken by the United States and its closest allies that kept the committee from completing its work on the draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

Many nonaligned countries plan to oppose the policy of the United States and its allies during the current session. For several years, this policy has been undermining UN attempts to convene an international conference to negotiate the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. At a session of the special UN committee on the Indian Ocean in July this year, the conference was scheduled to be held on 4 June of next year in Colombo despite all of the maneuvers of the American delegation.

The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1960 and gave the national liberation movement strong momentum, is also associated with the name of the Soviet Union. Even today, however, 23 years later, the actual implementation of this declaration is still on the UN General Assembly agenda. The main problem here is Namibia, which has been illegally occupied by South Africa with the connivance of the Western powers. The exact wording of one item on the agenda of the 38th session is "The actions of foreign economic and other circles preventing the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in all other territories under colonial domination, and the efforts to eradicate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa."

Several items on the agenda pertain to the explosive situation in the Middle East. The correction of this situation with the fair consideration of the legitimate interests of all states and peoples of this region is being impeded by U.S.-Israeli military cooperation, the encouragement of Israel's expansionist ambitions by American ruling circles, their attempt to find separate solutions in their own interest and their disregard for the inalienable national rights of the Palestinians.

The countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which now represent an impressive force in the international arena, are striving to defend their interests through collective action. The imperialist powers have set their hopes on the economic dependence of the developing countries, left over from colonial times, and are trying to use it as leverage to secure support for their own position. The American UN delegation is pursuing a policy of unconcealed authoritarianism. The head of the delegation, J. Kirkpatrick, is demanding unconditional support for the American position from all countries which receive so-called U.S. aid (the "Kirkpatrick Doctrine"). It is obvious that Washington is feeling nostalgic about the days when the obedient majority automatically voted along with the American delegate. But the times have changed. At the request of the developing countries, the session agenda includes the discussion of measures to eliminate the discriminatory barriers erected by the developed capitalist states in economic relations with the developing world, as well as other urgent problems connected with the struggle of the young states for a new international economic order. The connection between disarmament and development is another item on the agenda. This was a matter of special concern at the Sixth UNCTAD Session in Belgrade in June 1983, attended by the representatives of 160 countries. The conference called upon countries and peoples to bring detente and cooperation back to the world, stop the arms race, primarily the race for nuclear arms, reduce arms expenditures and use the resources thus made available to satisfy economic and social development needs.

The 38th Session of the UN General Assembly is also supposed to consider the implementation of the international convention on the law of the sea, which is the result of many years of concerted effort by the international community and which was opposed by the Reagan Administration although previous American administrations had attached great importance to the UN conference on this matter and had cooperated with it. It will also discuss the program of struggle drafted by the Committee on Information for a new international information order and the expansion of UN information activity.

Therefore, delegates to the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly will have to launch an intense search for solutions to the most important and urgent problems of the current stage of world development to justify the hopes of millions of people on earth. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries will join other peace-loving states--and they now constitute a huge majority--in using the General Assembly rostrum to continue and intensify the struggle to restrain forces for war and aggression and to secure a peaceful life for people. As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov stressed at the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "it is precisely socialism that has been the most consistent defender of healthy principles in international relations, the defender of the interests of detente and peace, the interests of each nationality and all mankind."

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REAGAN VERSION OF ASIAN-PACIFIC STRATEGY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 83 (signed to press 22 Aug 83) pp 7-19

[Article by V. P. Lukin]

[Text] The Asian and Pacific zone has long been one of the major areas of U.S. foreign policy activity along with Europe and Latin America. The very structure of the American imperialist "power center" and its relationship to the rest of the world were revealed and clarified during the process of U.S. foreign policy expansion in the Pacific region (along with the Atlantic and Latin American zones).

Later, as U.S. global strategy developed, new important spheres of interests became apparent. Soviet-American relations took the central place among international policy priorities. But this did not completely "neutralize" the geopolitical features of American foreign policy. The aims of American global strategy were combined, more or less organically (at different times and depending on many specific circumstances), with traditional foreign policy objectives; the latter became specific forms of its realization. There were times when U.S. regional policy (particularly in Asia) was closely and rigidly coordinated with Washington's principal strategic aims. But sometimes this connection was manifested in relatively less distinct political forms, and at those times the regional aims were distinguished by greater diversity.

What place does the Asian and Pacific zone occupy in the policy of the Reagan Administration?

Spring-Board for Confrontation

It is no secret that Soviet-American relations, interpreted in a rigidly ideologized way, emphasizing confrontation, are the central point of departure for the current administration's foreign policy activity. The ideologists and strategists of the current administration view Asia and the Pacific as one of the main spring-boards for direct military-political confrontation with the Soviet Union and with socialism in general. In this sense, the Reagan line represents a definite departure from the "multipolar" balancing that was substantiated and practiced in the United States at the beginning of the 1970's (the "Nixon Doctrine").

The Washington of the Nixon-Kissinger era felt it would be expedient to make perceptible reductions in the number of American armed forces located in Asia and the Pacific and took several steps on the political level to improve relations with its chief opponents (the USSR and PRC). At the same time, it began to pursue a tougher line, with less emphasis on ally obligations, in relations with its own allies (especially Japan). This laid the foundation for the "multipolar" Asian and Pacific diplomacy, within the framework of which specific strategic actions by the American administration were substantiated primarily by the pragmatic nationalist needs of U.S. ruling circles.

Later, when Ford and Carter were in office, attempts were made to subordinate "multipolar" diplomacy in Asia and the Pacific to traditional ideological anti-communist aims. For example, attempts to influence Soviet-Chinese relations in the U.S. interest were accompanied by increasingly persistent efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Japanese alliance and to use this as a basis for the stronger unity of all American allies in the region, a unity which had been shaken by the U.S. defeat in Indochina. In the second half of the 1970's the attempts of the Carter Administration to launch more vigorous attacks on socialism (in the form of the "human rights defense" campaign) gave rise to new spheres of conflict with antidemocratic and authoritarian allies in the zone, particularly the South Korean regime and some others.

In this respect, the line of the present administration is distinguished by the assignment of obvious priority to ideological and global-strategic antisocialist aims, prevailing over distinct and specific regional considerations. The current administration's point of departure in Asian and Pacific policy is its unequivocal subordination to the objectives of struggle against the Soviet Union, formulated in the most rigid anticommunist terms. All particular and specific problems, including regional ones, are viewed primarily and mainly from the standpoint of the supreme objective of struggle against the Soviet Union and the socialist world in general. Consequently, the "multipolar" diplomacy which was a guiding principle of the American approach to Asia and the Pacific during the previous decade has now been relegated to a position of secondary importance.¹

In an ex post facto justification of this latest change in American strategy, D. Zagoria, one of the prominent American Sovietologists with "Asian and Pacific leanings," writes in the foreword of a recently published book he edited that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States "will remain in the center of international relations in the 1980's, and possibly in the 21st century."² The authors of this work make an attempt to view this fundamental thesis through the prism of specific Asian and Pacific problems. This procedure is quite obviously dictated by the spirit of the times: Every effort is being made to conform to the prevailing conservative, obviously obsolete and outdated, interpretation of regional (and global) realities. The result is the sacrifice of all that was accumulated by American politically oriented Asian studies in the 1960's and 1970's during the course of difficult but productive investigations of matters connected with the appearance of states with differing social systems in Asia and the Pacific, states which many Americans had grown accustomed to treating as passive objects of U.S. foreign policy strategy, despite their active participation in regional politics at the very least.

It must be said that "multipolar" diplomacy has not been totally discarded--not on the level of theory or on the level of practice. Washington's desire to create conflicts between large Asian and Pacific powers (both socialist and capitalist) in its own interest is still an important element of its strategic calculations and is being implemented. Now, however, priority is assigned primarily to the "bipolar" approach, which is distinguished by the maximal subordination of specific foreign policy actions to general anticommunist ideological aims. The Asian and Pacific zone (just as the world as a whole) is regarded not as a sphere of international activity by a few large states and many medium-sized and small ones, but as a zone of clear-cut ideological and strategic confrontation between "ours" and "theirs." Therefore, in a certain sense, the distinguishing feature of the Reagan Administration's Asian and Pacific line is a refusal to consider regional features for the sake of the global "anticommunist project."

Priority to Alliances

What are the most significant effects of the general line described above?

Washington feels that raising American-Japanese ally relations to a qualitatively new level is its main objective in Asia and the Pacific. In a speech in San Francisco on 5 March 1983, dealing expressly with U.S. policy in Asia and the Pacific, Secretary of State G. Shultz quoted Ronald Reagan's remark that "no two countries are more interdependent than the United States and Japan." American-Japanese relations are now, more than ever before, regarded as the center of the system of antisocialist military-strategic alliances in this region.

For 15 or 20 years there have been definite fluctuations in the U.S. approach to Japan. On the one hand, American ruling circles have had a strong desire to stimulate the augmentation of Japanese military potential, regarding it as a major element of Western strength in the Pacific and in East and Southeast Asia. On the other, some segments of the American political elite (particularly the liberal one) are obviously worried about the possible long-range consequences of the acceleration of Japanese military development. This was quite apparent in American policy in Asia and the Pacific when the "multipolar" approach was the prevailing one. Later, as the "bipolar" line grew stronger, the influence of this factor on political practices became less noticeable.

As for the Reagan Administration, it hopes to remove it completely from the political arena. The current President and his closest advisers are apparently experiencing none of their predecessors' vacillation between a desire to augment the collective military strength of the capitalist states in the Pacific by stimulating the accelerated arming of Japan and the fear that the process of its military growth might become uncontrollable in the near or more distant future. Members of the Reagan Administration who are less inclined to analyze and assimilate the lessons of history are urging Japan to make dramatic breakthroughs in arms buildup programs and to quickly raise military expenditures to a level at least commensurate with the West European level.

Japan is well aware that one of Washington's main motives is the hope of reducing Japanese competitive potential in the world market and has put up some

resistance to American pressure. The struggle over the degree and rates of concession to Washington's increasing pressure is still going on in Japanese ruling circles.

Japanese Prime Minister Y. Nakasone's visit to the United States in January 1983 was an important milestone in contemporary American-Japanese relations. The current Japanese prime minister, who is known for his support of the idea of the accelerated creation of an "independent Japanese defense" system, agreed to a considerable rise in the level of U.S.-Japanese military cooperation: An agreement was reached on deliveries of U.S. military technology to Japan, binding Japan even more closely to the implementation of American military programs. Before Nakasone met with Reagan, he visited Seoul, where he reached an agreement with local dictator Chun Doo Hwan on the extension of 4 billion dollars in credit to South Korea, most of which will be used to augment South Korean military potential. In this way, Washington is paying its "strategic bills" with Japanese money. At a meeting in Williamsburg in June of this year, the Japanese prime minister expressed full agreement with Reagan's military-strategic aims.

The American leadership has been able to assign Japan a much more important role in the system of military-political alliances in the Far East, which are guided and directed by Washington and are aimed against the socialist states.

Broad segments of the Japanese public, including members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, are seriously displeased with the U.S. pressure on Japan in matters connected with "the augmentation of its military role," which is being exerted by the current conservative leadership in its usual crude and uncere-
monious manner. People in Japan are becoming increasingly aware that this pressure, camouflaged by loud talk about the "Soviet military threat," is largely due to serious conflicts between the two major imperialist powers of today's world in the economic sphere. According to American NEWSWEEK magazine, Nakasone visited the United States at a time when relations between Tokyo and Washington were "at their coolest point in recent years."³

This is not surprising: The deficit in the balance of trade in fiscal year 1982 was 20 billion dollars in Japan's favor and is expected to be even greater in the current fiscal year. The decidedly protectionist Reagan Administration does not want to reconcile itself to this. Furthermore, this situation, which stemmed from several factors but primarily from Japan's ability to displace the United States as the leader in several key industries, has displayed a tendency toward further intensification. Japan is reorganizing its production with an emphasis on science-intensive industries, but the United States is still the leader in this most important area. The Japanese monopolies' energetic climb to this top floor of the economy, dictated by the growing competition it has encountered from several "threshold" states in East and Southeast Asia in traditional Japanese export fields, has exacerbated Japanese-American economic conflicts, making them hard to solve in the near future. Whereas the two giants of contemporary capitalism were immersed in a "textile war" the day before yesterday, and in television and automobile wars yesterday (and these are certainly not over), now the seat of conflict is in electronics, optics, biological engineering and other industries which will be decisive economic

factors in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In view of all this, Washington's attempt to use loud talk about the "Soviet military threat" in order to "pocket" advanced Japanese technology "for the sake of stronger military cooperation" is obviously motivated by a desire to retain the leading position in progressive industries in the near future and complicate the Japanese economy's advance to new frontiers.

The current American administration apparently hopes to stimulate the rapid rearming of Japan and to simultaneously keep it under rigid military control by using just one tried and tested method--by frightening its junior partner with the "Sov'et threat."

But this method is not always foolproof. The American WALL STREET JOURNAL directed attention to the fact that when the current Japanese prime minister made a policy statement in parliament, he cited the danger of criticism from the United States, and not the increase in Soviet armed forces in the Far East, as the grounds for the buildup of Japanese military strength.⁴ More and more people in Japan, including members of ruling circles, have recently advised that national policy correspond more closely to the country's economic strength. This would make the country much more independent and much less vulnerable to American threats and pressure. Several West European states are often cited as examples of this process. Some American press organs have reminded their readers that Nakasone, who began his term as prime minister with ostentatious concessions to Washington, was once devoted to General de Gaulle and his policy line.

In an article published in the NEW YORK TIMES at the end of last year, researcher R. Steel from the Carnegie Foundation wrote: "The next move in Japanese politics, as indicated by the recent victory of Yasuhiro Nakasone, who has been named prime minister, will probably involve rearmament and, what is more, a fight for greater military and political independence of the United States. The rearming of Japan is being applauded in Washington, but this cannot be said about its desire for independence. These two tendencies, however, are interrelated. If Japan begins large-scale rearming, it will not allow its foreign policy to be made in Washington."⁵

Today, however, military and political relations with Japan are clearly being given priority in the assumption that Tokyo is obedient enough for now, and will be even more so in the future.

South Korea is still an important continental link of the Japanese-American alliance. It intrigues American conservative strategists because it is close to the Asian and Pacific socialist states that are regarded as the main military, political and ideological adversaries and because it has a large army (particularly its "critical" ground troops). The reinforcement of the South Korean army of 600,000 on the pretext of a "threat from the North" is being given increasing attention, and Japan is being asked to shoulder more and more of the financial burden.

In this way, Washington is trying to strengthen its triangular alliance with Tokyo and Seoul to create additional tension near the socialist states of the

region and to simultaneously recover some of the money which moved to Japan as a result of conditions unfavorable for the United States in bilateral trade.

To this end, large-scale maneuvers, code-named "Team Spirit" and involving American and South Korean subunits, were held in the southern half of the Korean peninsula at the beginning of this year. To the amazement of even those American analysts and experts on Asian and Pacific affairs who share Reagan's foreign policy views, these maneuvers coincided with Secretary of State G. Shultz' visit to the PRC. Furthermore, the American side was fully aware of the PRC's unequivocally negative position on this matter.⁶ This clearly underscored the regional antisocialist priorities of the conservative administration.

The "guilt complex" characteristic of the previous administration's approach to the South Korean dictatorship was resolutely pushed aside by Ronald Reagan and his advisers as something unrelated to the imperatives of anticommunist strategy. By February 1981, South Korean dictator Chun Doo Hwan, one of the main targets of the Carter Administration's criticism, was visiting Washington and meeting with Ronald Reagan (he was the first high-level foreign official to visit the new President). This quite clearly indicated that questions connected with the U.S. military presence on the territory of traditional American allies and clients and the political stability of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes of strategic importance to the United States would be assigned absolute priority by the new administration. This line has been pursued unconditionally since that time. American armed forces in South Korea have been reinforced, the South Korean army has been armed with modern American weapons and Seoul's military aid from Washington is growing: In fiscal year 1982 the Congress allocated 166 million dollars for this purpose and the administration then insisted on an additional 29 million dollars; in fiscal year 1983 the figure rose to 210 million.⁷

At the beginning of the 1980's, U.S. military contacts with Australia and New Zealand within the ANZUS bloc became perceptibly closer. With the energetic assistance of Washington, Australia adopted a 5-year plan for the modernization of its armed forces in 1980. According to this plan, there will be a rise of 7 percent in Canberra's military expenditures each year. The plan envisages the acquisition of 500 million dollars' worth of military equipment from the United States. When this program is carried out, Australia will have 75 F-18 planes, 10 P-3C patrol aircraft and some other modern types of weapons which will substantially increase Australia's potential for military presence (jointly with the United States, of course) in the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The plan assigns priority to a stronger Australian navy, specifically through the purchase of four U.S. frigates equipped with nuclear missiles. In combination with six submarines of the "Oberon" class and some destroyers of the "River" class, this will create an impressive force which is expected to play a perceptible role in carrying out American plans in the Pacific.

In March 1983, however, Washington strategists worried that these plans might not be realistic, and not without good reason. The conservative government of M. Fraser, an active supporter of stronger military ties with the United States within the ANZUS framework and on the bilateral level, suffered a defeat in the parliamentary elections and was replaced by the Labor Party, which has

taken a more cautious and realistic stand on these issues. When he was in the opposition, R. Haake, the leader of the Labor Party and the current prime minister, did not want ships carrying nuclear weapons to even visit Australia. The degree to which this position will influence the foreign policy activity of the new Australian Government will be seen in the future. In any case, when the new Australian prime minister visited the United States in June 1983, both sides underscored their loyalty to the ANZUS alliance but could not conceal the differences in their approaches to several specific foreign policy issues.

Personal Strength--Above All

The current administration regards the reinforcement of America's own military strength in the region as one definite way of restoring and uniting the military and political alliances directed by Washington and, in the broader context, of developing a political atmosphere favoring the United States. "We are the only nation in the region," Secretary of State G. Shultz said in a smug and categorical manner on 5 March 1983, "with a global outlook and the ability to pursue a global policy. As a great power, we have a special responsibility. We have accepted it and will continue to act accordingly."

In recent years there have been lively discussions in U.S. military-political circles about what would be safest and most convenient for Washington: to concentrate on the military reinforcement of its own allies and states considered to be strategically important to the United States for one reason or another, or to concentrate on the augmentation of personal military strength. These debates were of a general strategic nature and concerned problems and systems of priorities that far transcended the bounds of any one region. Nevertheless, there were distinctly regional aspects, particularly the issue of American military presence in Asia and the Pacific.

Conservative criticism (voiced by such individuals as Professors R. Klein, R. Myers, F. Weinstein and others)⁸ of some of the previous administration's strategic plans for this region essentially accused it of paying too much attention to various types of political maneuvers for anti-Soviet results and relying less on its own military strength as a means of exerting political pressure on allies and adversaries. In connection with this, the problem of maintaining and strengthening control over the sea lanes connecting the Pacific with the Indian Ocean is often cited as Washington's most important long-term interest in the Asian and Pacific zone. American strategists assert that the increased maneuverability of the Soviet Pacific fleet in these oceans and the expansion of its sphere of activity here are grounds for a new U.S. naval arms buildup in this region. Although Washington has demanded maximum assistance from its allies in this sphere, it nevertheless intends to continue playing the main military role.

There has recently been a substantial increase in the military strength of the groups operating under the aegis of the U.S. Pacific Command, which has controlled the activities of American armed forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans--that is, in a zone with an area of 259 million square kilometers (over 50 percent of our planet's surface)--since 1976. This process is developing in several directions.

First of all, a substantial buildup (primarily qualitative) of American anti-submarine forces has been undertaken, with emphasis on the creation of a highly sensitive acoustical surveillance system, capable of registering the precise location of submarines.

Secondly, since 1982 American submarines with ballistic missiles in the Pacific and Indian Oceans have been supplemented with the latest series of "Ohio" missile carriers, equipped with Trident missiles, which will considerably augment U.S. strategic strength in general and in this region in particular.

Thirdly, American naval forces in the Pacific have been reinforced considerably in the quantitative and qualitative sense in recent years. In particular, they have been supplemented with the latest nuclear-powered aircraft carrier "Carl Vinson" (81,600 tons) and the modernized battleship "New Jersey" (45,000 tons), equipped with 32 Tomahawk cruise missiles for the first time in the American Navy.⁹ According to American sources, these missiles will have conventional warheads at first, but their refitting with nuclear warheads would be no trouble at all. The "Carl Vinson" joined the aircraft carrier "Enterprise," operating as part of the American Seventh Fleet. The "New Jersey," which is capable of destroying other warships and targets on land from a distance of several hundred nautical miles (1 knot = 1.8 km), will begin operating independently in the South China Sea and the Persian Gulf this fall.

The American Pacific Fleet now consists of 7 aircraft carriers, 39 attack submarines (8 from the Seventh Fleet), 87 large surface ships (21 from the Seventh Fleet), 5 large landing vessels and over 80 auxiliary ships.¹⁰

Fourthly, aviation units deployed near the Soviet Union and other socialist states are being reinforced, including naval aviation units. More than 200 combat planes (F-4, F-15 and F-16), around 130 planes based on aircraft carriers (F-4, F-14, F-18, A-7 and A-6) and 65 naval aviation planes (F-18, F-4, AV-8A, A-18 and A-8) are deployed in Japan, including Okinawa, in South Korea, the Philippines, Guam and on board the aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet, as well as in Hawaii and Alaska and on the West Coast of the United States itself. The squadron of B-52 strategic bombers deployed on Guam has been expanded and enlarged. These subunits can be reinforced quickly with units located on American territory if the need should arise.

The recent growth of U.S. military strength in the Pacific allowed Washington to make significant changes in its strategic plans. In the second half of the 1970's the United States adhered to the so-called "pendulum strategy" in this region. In accordance with this, in the event of a conflict in Europe or the Near or Middle East, a large part of the American armed forces located permanently in Asia and the Pacific would be transferred to the West. This doctrine became the target of fierce criticism from conservatives, particularly during the presidential campaign of 1979-1980. Its opponents' main argument was that the transfer of U.S. armed forces under the Pacific Command to other regions in the event of a conflict could lead to the excessive "dispersion" of American forces in the region (creating a military "vacuum" in the Pacific) and this could change the overall regional balance in ways unfavorable for Washington and its allies. Giving in to pressure from the right, the Carter

Administration announced in April 1980 that it was giving up the "pendulum strategy" and would henceforth concentrate on the creation of forces designated for use exclusively in the Pacific theater. The Reagan Administration adopted this plan and amplified it by taking specific steps, including those mentioned above, to secure a constant presence in the West Pacific by the mid-1980's, composed of the kinds of armed forces which, in Washington's opinion, will guarantee the United States and its allies unilateral advantages, regardless of developments in neighboring regions. Military superiority in every region, in every part of the world, especially near the coastline of the Soviet Union--this ideal is now taking the form of specific plans and aims.

Reordering of Regional Priorities

One important factor influencing the actual political behavior of the current administration in Asia and the Pacific is Washington's reassessment of the role and significance of traditional allies.

The analysis of the objective changes that had taken place in East and South-east Asia in the past 10-15 years was a serious part of this reassessment. In this context, Washington regards the relatively rapid economic development of several states in this region and the resulting new opportunities and problems as the most important consideration.

In general, GNP growth rates in the capitalist and developing countries of Asia and the Pacific are far above the world average. By the beginning of the 1980's such countries and territories as Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and others had become "threshold" capitalist states with considerable industrial potential and extensive export capabilities. Intraregional trade has grown substantially in recent decades.

All of this could have an important long-range effect on Washington because the economic significance of the Asian and Pacific region is already increasing at a much higher rate than the significance of other regions (excluding the oil-rich Near and Middle East). Some American authors have suggested that the continuation of the current tendency toward the relatively more rapid economic development of the Pacific zone could make it the center of world economics in the 21st century, and perhaps even of world politics.

According to the authors of "A U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia: the 1980's and Beyond," the combined GNP of eight states in the Asian and Pacific zone (Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the five ASEAN countries) and of South Korea and Taiwan in 1980 approached 2 trillion dollars and the total volume of trade between them and the United States amounted to around 110 billion dollars, which exceeded U.S. trade with the EEC countries and is equivalent to around one-fourth of all American foreign trade.¹¹ All of this has created an objective basis for the ruling class in general to take a much greater interest in this region.

Conservatives in general and the groups closest to the current administration in particular have had their own response to this long-term tendency. They are distinguished by the desire to associate the Atlantic outlook with the policy

and views of their liberal political opponents. They have accused the latter, particularly the well-known Trilateral Commission, of underestimating the significance of other regions, of trying to reduce U.S. political maneuverability by proceeding from an excessively rigid interpretation of "civilized interdependence," etc. The conservatives say that West and East Asia are just as important as Western Europe in the strategic and economic sense from the standpoint of imperatives of anticommunist global strategy. In the foreword to the book mentioned above, its editor, Professor R. Myers, lists some "key principles" by which, he believes, American policy in Asia and the Pacific should be guided. The first on the list and the most important is worded: "The strategic significance of Asia is just as great as the strategic significance of Western Europe."¹²

As mentioned above, the current U.S. administration has assigned priority to military-strategic aspects in its policy in this region. At the beginning of Reagan's term in office, he and his advisers conveyed the impression that they did not want to confine the matter simply to these aspects and lose sight of the more fundamental, long-range aspects of U.S. relations with countries located west of the American coastline. In the beginning of 1981, for example, R. Allen, then the President's national security adviser, named the administration's diplomatic objectives and said that "the creation of a dynamic Pacific community with common economic and political interests and a common interest in safeguarding security" was the "immediate objective of the 1980's."

Allen was not the first to bring up the idea of a "Pacific community," and it was not even an American idea. It has long been discussed in Japanese and Australian academic and political circles. At the end of the 1970's, when M. Ohira's cabinet was in power in Japan, the idea first transcended the bounds of research groups and university seminars and became the official policy line of the main American ally in Asia. The next Japanese prime minister, Z. Suzuki, confirmed Japan's adherence to the idea of a "Pacific community" when the Reagan Administration was already in power in the United States.¹³

In the United States it evoked differing responses from various segments of the ruling class. Supporters of the concept of "interdependence" energetically applauded the particular aspects of the project which looked like a continuation and development of their hope for the maximal economic and social convergence of the leading capitalist states (even at the cost of some mutual concessions in the commercial sphere). Through their efforts, the U.S. approach to this issue began to be formulated, first in a number of scientific research centers (the Brookings Institution and the University of Hawaii, for example) and then in the Senate and House subcommittees on Asian and Pacific affairs.

But political and strategic considerations occupy the central position in the gradual increase of U.S. interest in various projects like the "Pacific community." At a time when the central objective of American policy is a stronger position in relation to socialist forces and national liberation movements, to be achieved by escalating international tension, U.S. ruling circles are energetically seeking new methods and bridgeheads for the organization of offensive actions. It has already been noted that the Pacific is regarded as one of the most important zones in this respect.

For several reasons, however, the unity of potential participants in this kind of offensive exclusively on a military-political basis has turned out to be difficult for Washington to achieve and has been unstable. Some American strategists feel that this unity must have the proper economic foundation. In this connection, various forms of institutionalized intraregional economic contacts seem extremely tempting and promising to them. American positions could be strengthened within the framework of these institutions, primarily in relation to the Japanese ally and rival. The United States hopes that the integrated structure will allow for the more effective use of its military, political and other leverage to keep the Japanese advances on American positions in this region under control. "The group of 10 Pacific states, actively supported by the United States," Director R. Cline of the Georgetown University Center for International Studies has said, "could change the world balance of power (in capitalism's favor, of course--V. L.) by developing multilateral trade and mutual diplomatic cooperation to strengthen common security interests."¹⁴ This program is proposed by one of the most prominent conservative members of the academic community as an alternative to the pragmatic "multipolar balance."

The Reagan Administration was quite enthusiastic about the idea of the "Pacific community" at first. It seemed that it would be implemented in diplomatic practice. But this has not happened, at least not yet.

The main reason for this would seem to be that although the conservatives want American imperialist interests in the Pacific to be promoted vigorously, they are also belligerently protectionist. Now that Japan and the "threshold" states in Asia and the Pacific are penetrating the American market and crowding out American businessmen, the administration does not and cannot make significant concessions in these matters. First of all, it does not want to make them because its chauvinistic view of the world forbids this and, secondly, it cannot because it would lose its traditional domestic political support. But the coordinated and institutionalized convergence of the Pacific capitalist states in the economic sphere will be impossible without these concessions. As a result, no further steps have been taken in support of the "Pacific economic community" proposed by Tokyo and Canberra.

Behind these largely temporary considerations, however, there is a serious change in the assessment of the role and place of this region in world economics and politics by an influential segment of the American ruling class. More solid participation in capitalist economic transactions by Asian and Pacific states and territories which were just recently extremely weak and socially underdeveloped will expand and strengthen the U.S. interest in this region over the long range, transcending the lifespan of any particular administration. This interest is now being restrained and neutralized by the current markedly protectionist tendencies. But the next change in the economic situation could also change this.

The current administration's more energetic political and diplomatic activity with regard to the ASEAN and to its individual members is interesting in this connection. A widely publicized meeting of official representatives of Washington and the five ASEAN countries took place last March in Washington in

the State Department building. High-level American officials make periodic trips to the capitals of ASEAN countries.

This increased attention after the 15 years during which this organization was virtually ignored is connected with Washington's view of the ASEAN countries, which neighbor on Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos, as a "frontline" in the struggle against socialism. This is the reason for their new position on Washington's scale of foreign policy priorities. This is also the reason for Washington's emphasis on military-strategic considerations in the reinforcement of alliances. Thailand, which was offered 133 million dollars in military and economic assistance in fiscal year 1983, and the Philippines, which received 155 million dollars in the form of the same kind of assistance, are being given special attention. A total of over 110 million dollars has been allocated to augment the military potential and American military equipment purchases of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

Over the long range, special attention will be given to Indonesia, which American conservative strategists regard as a potential strategic alternative to the SRV in Southeast Asia. This is the reason for Washington's current uncharacteristic diplomatic flexibility and patience in relations with Djakarta (the consent to replace an objectionable ambassador with Under Secretary of State J. Holdridge, a renowned expert on Asian affairs) and the reason for its financial generosity (in June 1983 Washington and several other capitalist states offered Indonesia a loan of 2 billion dollars).

Although the U.S. administration wants to attach the ASEAN to its own Pacific strategy, it is taking an extremely rigid and intransigent position with regard to the economic demands of its members. In particular, each specific proposal by the ASEAN countries on measures to liberalize foreign trade in areas of particular interest to them has been resolutely rejected. This uncompromising behavior gives rise to periodic conflicts and is the reason for the ASEAN states' negative attitude toward the idea of the "Pacific community."

Reagan Administration policy in Asia and the Pacific does not have an striking or "dramatic" features as yet. No new "Pacific doctrine" has been proposed, although many previous administrations were quite lavish with these. No sweeping and alluring programs have been put forth. On the surface, activity has been confined to periodic ritual visits by high-level Washington officials and the presentation of official speeches, as was the case when G. Shultz made his summer tour of Asia. The U.S. secretary of state visited the Philippines and Thailand, addressed the 16th conference of ASEAN foreign ministers and made brief stops in India and Pakistan.

But this externally "non-garish" activity conceals important tendencies which could be extremely dangerous for the cause of peace and security in the region. The conservative U.S. leadership is striving methodically, step by step, to draw more precise dividing lines in the region and sharper lines of confrontation, to escalate tension on these lines and to build up muscle for the more effective conduct of future military actions. This strategy poses a threat to the cause of peace.

FOOTNOTES

1. In light of all this, V. I. Denisov's statement (see PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1983, No 1, p 13) that Reagan's policy in Asia displayed internal continuity with the premises of the "Guam doctrine" and the "Ford doctrine" does not seem entirely correct. This is true only in the broadest context, the context of general long-range antisocialist aims. On a more specific level, there is a sizeable conceptual and actual foreign policy difference between the "multipolar" approach and the "bipolar" approach of overt confrontation.
2. "Soviet Policy in East Asia," edited by D. Zagoria, New Haven and London, 1982, p IX.
3. NEWSWEEK, 31 January 1983, p 31.
4. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3 January 1983.
5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 7 December 1982.
6. The "Chinese aspect" of Washington's Asian policy will not be examined in this article because it warrants separate analysis.
7. CURRENT HISTORY, April 1982, p 184.
8. "A U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia: the 1980's and Beyond," edited by R. Myers, Stanford (California), 1982; "Asian Security in the 1980's. Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition. The China Factor," edited by R. Solomon, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1980; "Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene," edited by R. Solomon, N.Y., 1981; etc.
9. CURRENT HISTORY, April 1982, p 146.
10. Ibid., p 148.
11. "A U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia," p 12.
12. Ibid., p XIX.
13. Suzuki's speech in Honolulu, when he presented his interpretation of the "Pacific community" concept, had definite repercussions. YOMIURI (Tokyo), 16 June 1982.
14. "A U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia," p 15.

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USSR-CANADA: TAKING THE ROAD OF COOPERATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 83 (signed to press 22 Aug 83) pp 55-61

[Article by B. I. Alekhin and I. B. Runov]

[Text] Events attesting to the positive development of Soviet-Canadian relations took place in spring 1983 and stimulated the further development of these relations in the interests of peace and productive mutually beneficial cooperation. A delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet, headed by M. S. Gorbachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union, was in Canada on an official visit from 17 to 24 May, and the third session of the intergovernmental Soviet-Canadian joint commission, created for the implementation of a long-range agreement signed in July 1976 on the promotion of economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation, was held in Moscow from 1 through 3 June.*

The purpose and significance of these events must be judged within the general context of relations between the two countries.

Let us recall that whereas their development in the 1970's was dynamic, they have recently been extremely uneven--and we are not to blame. The conservative government headed by J. Clark, who took office in February 1979, supported the U.S. line of undermining detente and cooperation with the USSR and instituted "sanctions" against the Soviet Union in January 1980, causing the reduction of bilateral economic, scientific, technical and cultural contacts. When the liberals returned, led by P. Trudeau, a gradual departure from the previous cabinet's position with regard to the USSR began. In January 1982--that is, at the very height of the anti-Soviet campaign in the West over the events in Poland--the Trudeau government signed a protocol to renew a trade agreement with the USSR (of February 1956), reaffirming the obligation of both sides to promote the continued development of mutual trade and the expansion of commodity exchange. By February 1982, however, the Canadian side reduced contacts with the USSR in the sphere of science and technology under the pressure of the American administration and Canada's own reactionaries, and also postponed the

* For more detail, see the report by V. B. Povolotskiy in issue No 10, 1976, and the article by L. A. Bagramov and V. B. Povolotskiy in No 12, 1977.

third session of the joint commission indefinitely. The attempts of these circles to convince the Trudeau government to take a harder line in relations with the USSR were unsuccessful, however, and did not involve the country in the Washington-instigated economic attacks on the Soviet Union.

In 1982 and 1983 the Canadian leadership and Trudeau himself repeatedly advocated the development of cooperation and the continuation of the political dialogue between East and West and spoke out against trade barriers. When Trudeau met with Reagan in April 1983, for example, he asked the President to stop trying to force his allies to institute "sanctions" against the USSR and other socialist countries. A month later he said in a TORONTO STAR interview that he does "not believe that the people in and around the U.S. administration who expect us to exert pressure on the Russians are being realistic.... When it comes to nuclear matters, I cannot agree with the United States in many respects." The Canadian leader said that Washington's statement about the possibility of winning a nuclear war was absurd. In his words, the Canadian public correctly interprets Reagan's policy as "belligerent and so hostile toward the Soviet Union that he (Reagan--Author) cannot be trusted."

For its part, the USSR has continued its consistent struggle to preserve and strengthen detente and to develop equitable cooperation with other states. The accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th party congress said that "there is also considerable potential for the development of relations with Canada. The door to further and broader cooperation with it, just as with other capitalist states, will remain open." The invariably peaceful policy of the USSR and our resolute repulsion of the provocations of Canadian reactionaries have aided in the preservation of the legal and organizational structure of cooperation with Canada and even in its advancement in some fields.

For example, trade volume--and this is the most important element of Soviet-Canadian relations--was much greater in the second half of the 1970's than in the first (see table). And this was not only due to larger Canadian shipments of grain to the USSR, which accounted for more than 90 percent of the value of imports from Canada. Total "non-grain" turnover also increased. Soviet industrial exports to Canada increased primarily as a result of larger shipments of machine-building products (they account for more than 60 percent of all exports). Since the middle of the 1970's the major items in this trade have been Belarus' tractors, Lada passenger cars, machine tools, forging and pressing equipment and power engineering equipment. Canadian industrial exports to the USSR also increased substantially (mainly machines, equipment and raw materials).

In 1982 Canada ranked tenth among our Western trade partners and the Soviet Union ranked fourth among Canada's clients. Trade with the USSR provides 50,000 Canadians with jobs. Professor K. McMillan of Carlton University made a accurate statement that "it creates a vitally important market for some Canadian companies and whole industries." Besides this, revenues from exports to the USSR cover much of the deficit in Canada's balance of trade in other areas. All of this underscores the groundlessness of the allegations that are still being made by some Canadians that the USSR is deriving unilateral advantages from cooperation with Canada.

USSR Trade with Canada, millions of rubles

Years	Exports		Imports		Turnover		Balance	
	Total	m/e*	Total	m/e*	Total	m/e*	Total	m/e*
1971	12.4	0.2	136.2	3.9	148.6	4.1	-123.8	-3.7
1972	18.7	0.4	281.1	5.9	299.8	6.3	-262.4	-5.5
1973	20.9	1.1	244.1	1.0	265.0	2.1	-223.2	0.1
1974	28.9	2.7	82.1	1.6	111.0	4.3	-53.2	1.1
1975	31.0	7.2	439.3	19.6	471.2	26.8	-407.4	-12.4
1976	41.9	18.2	499.3	24.8	541.2	43.0	-457.4	-6.6
1977	49.2	10.6	368.8	40.7	418.0	51.3	-319.6	-30.1
1978	28.7	13.0	358.9	46.3	387.6	59.3	-330.2	-33.3
1979	32.4	19.1	453.4	61.3	485.8	80.4	-421.0	-42.2
1980	30.0	17.7	971.6	44.7	1001.6	62.4	-941.6	-27.0
1981	49.5	30.8	1376.9	6.6	1426.4	37.4	-1327.4	24.2
1982	20.7	13.8	1375.1	32.9	1395.8	46.7	-1354.4	-19.1
1971-75	112.8	11.6	1182.8	32.0	1295.6	43.6	-1070.0	-20.4
1976-80	182.2	78.6	2655.4	217.8	2836.2	296.4	-2473.2	-139.2

* Machines and equipment.

"Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR" [USSR Foreign Trade], statistical surveys for corresponding years.

One of the main reasons for the increased trade in manufactured goods since the mid-1970's was the 500 million Canadian dollars in credit extended to the Soviet Union in May 1975 for purchases of Canadian machines, equipment and services. As for Soviet exports to Canada, the most important growth factor here is probably the activity of the Soviet-Canadian joint societies for the sale of machines and equipment--Belarus Equipment of Canada (tractors and agricultural implements), Stan-Canada Machinery (machine tools and forging and pressing equipment) and EMEK Trading (power engineering equipment). Their work over the past decade proved that the careful consideration of local conditions, a businesslike attitude, enterprise, a developed sales network and well-organized marketing methods facilitate the successful sale of our manufactured goods even in a market as complex as the Canadian one. Trade has also been promoted by the agreement signed in January 1971 on cooperation in the use of scientific and technical achievements in industry. In several cases, it served as an instrument for the disclosure of the export and import capabilities of the two countries.

Since the middle of the 1970's visits to our country by delegations of Canadian businessmen have become commonplace. There have been more than 10 such visits since 1976. They are organized and financed by the governments of various Canadian provinces and help businessmen learn how the Soviet market works and find out more about Soviet demand and the organization and procedures of USSR foreign trade. In short, they provide them with the important information they need for the conclusion of contracts.

In the late 1970's and early 1980's, however, several important problems and difficulties in the development of trade came to light.

Canadian firms have expressed an interest in the further growth of shipments of machines and equipment to the Soviet Union for the oil and gas, timber, woodworking and pulp and paper industries, agriculture and several other sectors. But the Canadian side's refusal to conclude a new credit agreement and the Clark government's anti-Soviet campaign caused our foreign trade organizations to take an understandably cautious approach to the placement of orders in the Canadian market. The sharp drop in Canadian exports of engineering products to the USSR--and, what is more, during the economic crisis of 1980-1981--was the price the Canadian business community had to pay for the nearsighted policy of its government. There was a simultaneous reduction in Soviet sales in the Canadian market, which intensified the trade imbalances stemming primarily from grain shipments (see table).

There is a great deal of potential for a broader commodity assortment in mutual trade. As yet, Soviet exports to Canada consist of only 50 percent of the products envisaged in the long-range program for economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation (adopted in October 1978), and Canada exports only 40 percent of these products to the USSR.

There have been positive changes in the sphere of scientific and technical contacts, although potential here is also far from exhausted (current cooperation covers no more than 30 percent of the projects listed in the program).

The abovementioned 1971 agreement served as a kind of "starter" for the entire mechanism of scientific and technical cooperation in industry. The activities of the joint commission and of the working groups and groups of experts it created for the implementation of this agreement allowed Soviet and Canadian specialists to learn all the details about each other's achievements in many fields and to work out a specific program of cooperation after determining the enterprises, organizations and firms capable of working on this program. In the mid-1970's, when the stage of initial investigation had ended, matters progressed from the use of only the simplest forms of cooperation (the exchange of specialists and of information, bilateral symposiums, etc.) to the joint organization and conduct of scientific and technical projects, primarily under the supervision of the working group on the petroleum industry (the testing of Soviet turbodrills in Canada and their subsequent perfection; the drilling of an exploratory oil well in permafrost; the testing of a welded pump rod for oil production in Canada, etc.).

Cooperation was also extremely active in the working groups on the gas industry, the timber, pulp and paper and woodworking industry, architecture, construction and the construction materials industry, transportation, agriculture, agricultural machine building and the processing industry, although this cooperation is still being conducted in the simplest forms. It must be said that scientific and technical contacts, just as the trade in several types of manufactured goods, is aimed primarily at the resolution of problems common to the USSR and Canada by virtue of the natural and geographic similarities of these countries. For example, projects connected with economic activity in bleak climates and inaccessible regions are priority matters.

In recent years the work of improving the legal and organizational structure of economic relations has been continued. We should recall that their common legal basis is the long-range agreement to promote economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation. It was intended to serve as an effective instrument, capable of raising our economic contacts to a qualitatively new level--from the simple exchange of commodities, services and knowledge to more complex forms of industrial cooperation. In line with this agreement, the USSR and Canada drafted a long-range program for economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation and signed it in October 1978. This document put all of the work performed on the basis of the 1971 agreement on a higher level. It records the first coordinated statement on complex, nontraditional forms of cooperation. For example, it envisages the possible participation of the organizations, enterprises, firms and banks of one country in the construction, enlargement and modernization of production capacities in the other country. In particular, it acknowledges the presence of opportunities for participation by Canadian firms in the construction of industrial facilities in the USSR, including facilities whose products might be of interest to Canada. The equipment, technical documents, licenses, expertise, materials and services purchased for these projects can be paid for completely or partially with deliveries of products from the USSR.

There have also been new advances in the development of cooperation in agriculture. In September 1981, for example, when Canadian Minister of Agriculture E. Whelan visited our country, an agreement on cooperation in this area was concluded. It encompasses the planning and forecasting of agricultural production, farming, animal husbandry and poultry breeding, land use, the mechanization of agriculture, the use of material resources in agriculture, the processing, storage and canning of products, land reclamation, the development of reclamation equipment and the use of mathematical methods and computers in agriculture. The planning, organization and implementation of joint programs and projects are envisaged in addition to traditional forms of cooperation.

Another important step in the development of Soviet-Canadian relations was the October 1982 Canadian trip of a delegation headed by USSR Minister of Agriculture V. K. Mesyats. The first session of the Soviet-Canadian joint commission on cooperation in agriculture, created in accordance with the abovementioned agreement, was held during this visit, and a long-range program for cooperation in agriculture was signed. It envisages the collection, study and use of world vegetable resources, the joint development of new technology to combat soil erosion and industrial technology for the cultivation of various crops, the resolution of problems in integrated plant protection systems, the improvement of industrial technology for the production of milk, meat and fodder, the development of cultivation and sowing equipment and the development of new methods of storing, processing and shipping agricultural products.

The warmer political climate in bilateral relations and the gradual expansion of economic cooperation created favorable conditions for the abovementioned visit to Canada in May of this year by a Soviet delegation headed by M. S. Gorbachev.

In Ottawa, M. S. Gorbachev gave P. Trudeau a personal message from General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov and an invitation to visit the Soviet Union. The desire to develop bilateral relations and to work together on the resolution of international problems was expressed in the message.

During talks with P. Trudeau, members of his government and the leaders of the main political parties and in speeches presented to parliamentarians and representatives of the Canadian public and business community, M. S. Gorbachev discussed the need to preserve peace on earth and possible ways of keeping the peace and explained the Soviet foreign policy initiatives aimed at curbing the arms race, effecting disarmament, strengthening trust between states and consolidating detente. He also declared that "our state's line in relations with Canada has been consistent and principled. We want good and friendly relations with out 'transpolar neighbor,' broader mutually beneficial cooperation in all areas and the continuation and intensification of political dialogue."

M. S. Gorbachev and P. Trudeau discussed a large group of issues. They expressed their common satisfaction with the gradual improvement of Soviet-Canadian relations and with the Soviet delegation's visit. They stressed the need to keep channels of communication open, especially on the summit level. Both sides acknowledged their belief in the urgent need for continued dialogue and for agreements in all possible areas.

Special emphasis was placed on the investigation of possibilities for broader agricultural cooperation. As we know, the USSR Food Program presupposes the maximal use of our own domestic resources. Nevertheless, cooperation with other states will play a decisive role and, as the head of the Soviet delegation remarked, Canada has been assigned an important place in this program by virtue of the similar soil and climatic conditions of the two countries and their many years of regular contacts and exchanges. To reinforce this tendency, our delegation toured the country and learned about Canada's latest achievements in agriculture, agricultural machine building, the processing industry and so forth.

"Mutually beneficial cooperation, and not confrontation, is our program," M. S. Gorbachev said in Canada. "It would be much better if countries were to work together to solve ecological, energy, agricultural and other common problems, guided by the natural and geographic similarities of various countries, including the USSR and Canada. We would like the Arctic region to be a zone of joint scientific research and exploration, and not a theater of war. The distance between continents should not be measured according to the flight time of ballistic missiles, but according to the closeness of our common human values, the main one being life itself."

These words also described the prevailing atmosphere a week later at meetings of the Intergovernmental Soviet-Canadian joint commission in Moscow in the beginning of June. This third session was held after an interval of almost 5 years and it was therefore of greater interest to Soviet and Canadian participants. The Canadian side was represented by a federal government delegation headed by Canadian Minister of State for International Trade G. Regan.

The delegation was accompanied by a group of Canadian businessmen. The Soviet delegation was headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade V. N. Sushkov, who also chaired the session. The session was also attended by the administrators of several all-union foreign trade associations involved in export and import transactions with Canadian firms. The agenda reflected basic spheres of bilateral cooperation in economics, science and technology and the desire of the two sides to promote its further progress. Specific topics of discussion included the state of commercial relations and means of developing them, the activities of working groups and measures to develop scientific, technical and industrial cooperation, and the financing of Canadian exports to the USSR.

The problem of expanding Soviet exports to Canada was a major topic of discussion. This problem has existed for some time, but it has recently become particularly significant in connection with the dramatic imbalance of mutual trade as a result of our purchases of Canadian grain. This is why Soviet participants naturally asked whether it would be possible to eliminate existing barriers to Soviet commodity shipments to Canada. Specific possibilities and methods of organizing industrial cooperation, particularly as a means of expanding Soviet exports to Canada, were discussed. The Canadian side sympathized with this problem and acknowledged that it was a matter of mutual interest. After all, it is impossible to keep selling to the same country without ever buying anything from it. Sooner or later, the growing imbalance will unavoidably impede mutual trade. This common position is expressed in the following manner in the final document of the session, its protocol: "During the discussion of Soviet exports to Canada, the two sides noted that their expansion would have a favorable effect on the further development of mutual trade and expressed their willingness to promote the development of Soviet exports. In connection with this, the two sides noted the positive role of societies operating in Canada with participation by Soviet organizations and agreed to encourage this activity in line with the long-range agreement of 1976."

In turn, the Canadian delegation and representatives of the Canadian business community expressed their willingness to supply the USSR with various types of modern equipment and technology, including equipment for the petroleum and gas industry (particularly for work in Arctic regions and for off-shore drilling), the timber and pulp and paper industry, the chemical industry and agriculture, in addition to the traditional trade item--grain. Our partners stressed that Canada has advanced--and, in some cases, unique--equipment and technology in these industries and expressed the willingness to supply the USSR with them and to cooperate with Soviet organizations in these fields.

But willingness is not enough. It is also necessary to secure the competitive potential of goods, and in the case of contemporary international trade in machines and equipment this includes the provision of the necessary credit terms. These problems were discussed at length. Both sides noted the importance of competitive export credit terms for trade expansion and agreed to continue negotiating the matter. It was also noted that, in spite of certain positive advances, Canadian firms still know little about the Soviet market and have not displayed enough commercial energy and initiative in comparison to their West European and Japanese rivals. Broader participation by firms

and organizations of the two countries in exhibits and seminars could serve as a convenient way of learning more about one another's export capabilities and import needs. The two sides pledged to encourage this kind of participation.

Scientific and technical cooperation has recently suffered a slight decline after reaching a specific level, and it is therefore understandable that the increased activity of the joint commission's working groups was a central topic of discussion. The Soviet and Canadian leaders of working groups who attended the session were able to meet beforehand in the corresponding ministries and departments of the USSR to discuss their joint work and the difficulties they had encountered and to make specific proposals and suggestions with regard to the subject matter of joint projects, new fields of cooperation, the organization of joint research, etc. During the course of a constructive and productive exchange of views, the joint commission confirmed the importance of the activities of working groups as a means of promoting the successful expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation in trade, economics, industry, science and technology. As for the practical results of this work, the two sides specifically mentioned the new opportunities for scientific and technical exchanges and the possibility of future industrial cooperation in fields connected with the implementation of the Soviet food program, with the exploitation of oil and gas resources, etc.

The development of cooperation between the USSR and Canada was also discussed when the Canadian delegation met and spoke with the heads of several Soviet ministries, departments and organizations immediately following the session at the beginning of June in Moscow. Secretary M. S. Gorbachev of the Central Committee, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, received Canadian Minister of State for International Trade G. Regan.

It is particularly significant that both delegations at the session recognized the need to continue active joint efforts in trade, industry, science and technology. This will aid in the overall development of Soviet-Canadian relations, will secure an atmosphere of detente and mutually beneficial cooperation and will thereby promote the implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which both Canada and the USSR participated. Our countries have been able to achieve progress in cooperation at a time when the international atmosphere has been charged with tension, and they have the right to expect good prospects for the development of bilateral relations.

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ACDA LEADERSHIP SEEN REFLECTING REAGAN ANTI-ARMS-CONTROL STANCE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 83 (signed to press 22 Aug 83) pp 62-64

[Article by S. Ye. Puzanov: "Behind the Screen of 'Arms Control'"]

[Text] The appointment of K. Adelman¹ as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) gave rise to a whole new series of debates in U.S. political circles about the role of this government agency and the essence of administration policy on "arms control."

When the agency was created in 1961, then President J. Kennedy declared that its creation meant that arms limitation issues would be given the necessary attention and that "the powerful intellect which created all destructive types of weapons would direct its efforts toward the creation of an arms control system." As B. Blechman, who was the assistant to the ACDA director in 1977-1979, remarked in an article about the future procedure of arms limitation talks, published in fall 1980 in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, just before Ronald Reagan, the protege of U.S. conservative forces, took office, the conflicting aims of the agency, reflected in its very title, have virtually nullified the efforts of the more or less sincere advocates of arms limitation who have worked for the agency at various times. "In the term 'arms control,' political leaders found a convenient way of manipulating public demands," Blechman wrote. He predicted that opponents of the SALT II treaty would not be pleased by any kind of changes in the text of the document because they wanted the very process of arms limitation to be stopped and they "will never support any arms control initiatives." The last 3 years have completely corroborated this expert forecast.²

When Ronald Reagan entered the White House, people who had always opposed arms limitation were appointed to the ACDA--active members of the Committee on the Present Danger,³ who agreed completely with the President and his advisers that nuclear weapons were the main trump card and a necessary instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

For example, E. Rostow, who had served as under secretary of state from 1966 to 1969 and was one of the leaders of the Committee on the Present Danger from 1976 to 1980, became the director of the agency. When his nomination was being discussed by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in June 1981, he

demanding that arms control policy be "linked" with the resurrected policy of Soviet "containment" and frankly discussed the possibility of "limited nuclear war." Well-known "hawk" P. Nitze was appointed head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. E. Rowny became the head of the American delegation at the strategic arms reduction talks (START). He had represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the American SALT delegation but resigned as soon as the SALT II treaty had been signed and began to criticize the treaty.

The U.S. delegations at talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and START have always taken a hard line, absolutely consistent with the administration's efforts to attain military superiority and to build up its nuclear arsenal. But even this pair of "hawks" did not seem anti-Soviet and anti-disarmament enough to the ruling clique.

The activities of the Rostow-headed ACDA were constantly being criticized by conservative senators, led by North Carolina Republican J. Helms, although the agency director did not make a single positive move. Helms voiced particularly vehement objections to the appointment of specialists involved in the drafting of the SALT I and SALT II agreements to responsible positions in the agency. In particular, R. Gray and N. Terrell were subjected to attacks of this kind. As a result of the obstructionist behavior of the Senate committee, which refused to approve their nominations (Terrell decided to decline the nomination), the agency was understaffed for a long time: Only one of the four assistant director appointments was approved--G. George. Besides this, substantial cuts were made in the agency budget.

As the director of the agency, Rostow was also criticized harshly by liberals in the Senate and House of Representatives, who were disturbed by the lack of progress in the Geneva talks.

The administration's own stance also aroused numerous complaints in the press and in groups of specialists and analysts for its confusion, inconsistency and lack of a precise line. It was noted that the President was seeking only an arms buildup, and that his remarks about the hope of concluding a "genuine" agreement, "limiting the military potential" of the Soviet Union and United States, were made exclusively for propaganda purposes because his so-called "peace initiatives" were aimed at unilateral military advantages for the United States.

The administration chose to make Rostow the "scapegoat" for the 2 years of unproductive Washington policy in the area of arms control. His resignation, announced on 13 January 1983, showed, as former ACDA Director J. Smith told VORWAERTS magazine, "the world public the prevailing confusion in the administration and in its policy on arms control." Senator P. Tsongas, Democrat from Massachusetts, agrees. If the conservative Rostow was "unacceptable to the administration," he said, "it is very difficult to understand what direction we are taking."

The resignation of the ACDA director might not have evoked such lengthy debates if the new directorial candidate had not been K. Adelman. Although the agency

does not play a leading role in foreign policymaking, changes in its leadership usually reflect administration attitudes toward the policy and the entire process of arms limitation. If "hawk" Rostow is replaced by "superhawk" Adelman, a tougher line in relations with the Soviet Union and the payment of even less attention to arms limitation issues are all that can be expected.

We should recall that when Adelman testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in connection with this appointment, even his supporters were stunned by his responses. He not only proved to know little about questions of arms control, but also took a negative stance on the entire process of arms limitation. Around 50 members of the House of Representatives circulated a joint statement which said: "Adelman displayed shocking ignorance in the sphere of arms control. Besides this, he regards the very process with contempt. We are deeply disillusioned with the President's decision to appoint this man to a position of such great responsibility and we feel that this move reflects the administration's own offhanded attitude toward arms control in general." But the President had no intention of replacing his nominee and pressured the legislators for a discussion of this nomination in the Senate at large, where the Republicans hold the majority. There the nomination was approved (57 for and 42 against).

The nomination of David Emery as deputy director of the agency is also indicative. He, like Adelman, has no experience in the sphere of arms control. After receiving a bachelor of science degree in electronics from the Worcester Polytechnical Institute in 1970, Emery moved into politics. In 1971-1974 he was a member of the House of Representatives of the state of Maine and in 1975 he was elected to the U.S. Congress. In 1982 he ran for the Senate but lost the race. Both of the ACDA leaders are distinguished by extreme rightwing views.

The debates over Adelman's appointment reflected dissatisfaction with the general line of the Reagan Administration in this sphere. Even White House officials admitted that opponents of the Adelman nomination tried to use the discussion of his nomination to point up the fact that "the administration has not acted energetically enough" in the arms limitation talks.

According to political analysts, the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmed that the administration does not care at all about arms limitation. This was attested to, in particular, by the appointment of incompetent and indifferent people to responsible ACDA positions.

After Rostow's resignation, a decision was made to replace Nitze as the head of the U.S. delegation at the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, but as the State Department announced, the United States "will be destroyed in the eyes of Europeans if both of them (Rostow and Nitze) should leave the stage."

Another piece of news which focused the attention of political analysts on the ACDA was the "blacklist" compiled by E. Rowmy, the head of the American START delegation. It was published in the NEW YORK TIMES on 24 March 1983. It was a list of "unreliable" members of the agency staff and the U.S. delegation

which he presented to the new ACDA director before his appointment had been approved by the Senate. The list was attached to a report in which Rowny wrote that "the agency is badly managed and makes dubious expenditures; the wrong people are on its staff."

The appointment of Adelman and Emery to responsible positions in the ACDA has aroused the worst fears of the American public about future policy on arms limitation, even in the meager form in which it has been practiced in recent years. According to Senator A. Cranston, an experienced member of the Foreign Relations Committee, "now there is more reason than ever before for the fear that the administration regards negotiations as a trick, as a way of calming the legitimate fears of the public while simultaneously finding a pretext for endless military expenditures."

Judging by all indications, the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will continue to consist precisely in this--in serving as a pretext and propaganda screen.

FOOTNOTES

1. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 7--Editor's note.
2. Ibid., 1981, No 4, pp 75-78.
3. For more about the Committee on the Present Danger, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1979, No 12, p 22.

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BOOK ABOUT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 83 (signed to press 22 Aug 83) pp 103-104

[Review by L. I. Kozhina of book "How Little Is Enough? SALT and Security in the Long Run" by Francis P. Hoerber, Crane, Russak and Co., 1981, XVIII + 54 pages]

[Text] The Reagan Administration's foreign policy line is distinguished by sharply intensified anti-Sovietism, unprecedented arms race escalation, attempts to take an increasingly hard line in relations with socialist countries and a resulting increase in the danger of nuclear war. To divert world public attention from the extremely dangerous implications of this line, Washington has launched a broad propaganda campaign to justify the current aims of American foreign policy.

Arguments characteristic of conservative bourgeois researchers are part of this propaganda campaign. In particular, this applies to the issues of strategic arms limitation and disarmament in general. The subject of this review will provide a fairly complete understanding of the American political scientists' "arguments."

The author of the work, F. Hoerber, headed a group of experts on military-political strategy in a number of research institutes, including the Experimental Research Institute of Johns Hopkins University, from 1953 to 1974. He has written many articles and books. He is also the co-author of a series of works entitled "Arms, Men and Military Budgets," published by the Center for Defense Information.

The work under review does not try to answer the question its title asks. In essence, the author analyzes several political and military factors and tries to use this as a basis for a general description of the Soviet-U.S. strategic arms reduction and limitation talks (START) (p 5).

Hoerber's main conclusion is essentially the following: Regardless of how tempting and promising the goals of arms control might seem, the basic guidelines for its accomplishment must be considered and negotiated separately (p XIII). According to him, START and all other arms control talks must be conducted with consideration for the basic parameters of "U.S. security" (that

is, U.S. strategic and conventional weapon requirements) and with a view to basic U.S. military doctrines and "existing difficulties" connected with the maintenance of the strategic balance of power between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.

Analyzing all of this from the standpoint of the notorious "U.S. security" interests, the author argues that the existence of so-called "imbalances" in the strategic positions and military-political concepts of the USSR and the United States must be taken into account in the assessment of the steps that are being taken now and might be taken in the near future to lower the level of strategic arms. For example, the SALT II treaty would not strengthen U.S. security, Hoeber says, but would even "perpetuate" and "legitimize" the existing imbalance he sees in some types of offensive weapons, and this will supposedly give the USSR "a first-strike advantage" (p 7). In another section the author asserts that whereas the United States actually has no strategic defense system, the USSR has drafted a program for active and passive strategic defense systems (pp 8-10).

By raising these and other questions in this form, the author is deliberately obscuring the issue. In reality, the USSR and the United States have reached full agreement on these matters, as reflected in the 1972 ABM treaty. This treaty was ratified by the U.S. Congress. It envisages two complete ABM systems for each side. When L. I. Brezhnev visited the United States in 1973, our countries agreed to have one ABM system each; all other parameters of the maintenance of the principle of equality and equivalent security are stipulated in the SALT II treaty, which was not ratified by the U.S. Congress.

When American militaristic circles and the author of this book discuss the myth of the "Soviet threat" and the "threat to U.S. security," they are actually trying to push new arms buildup programs through the Congress, and this could create the kind of international climate that would make it impossible to take the necessary measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war and could disrupt the existing strategic balance.

In this work, F. Hoeber makes a provocative statement: The significant reduction of strategic nuclear arms, he says, will give rise to many difficult problems and will supposedly "set traps" for the United States (p XIV).

Furthermore, expressing doubts about the possibility of reaching an agreement on a balanced level of strategic weapons, Hoeber suggests that significant reduction could be contrary to the interests of, once again, "U.S. security" (p 39). The only effective way of avoiding these "dangers" and preventing a nuclear conflict, he feels, is arms control. In connection with this, he stipulates the exact guidelines of arms control negotiation and, what is more, proposes that this control extend not only to a larger number of parameters of strategic weapons, but also to some types of defensive arms (p XV).

At the end of the work, Hoeber advises the Pentagon to take certain "preventive measures" on a unilateral basis and recommends "the most serious" approach to the restoration and permanent maintenance of American military strength in the interests of NATO unity and "stronger U.S. security" (pp 40-43). F. Hoeber

expresses the opinions of the particular American politicians who believe that the United States should continue augmenting and updating its strategic potential.

All of these onesided proposals are contrary to the principles of equality and equivalent security. The proposed policy could destabilize the international situation, give rise to new seats of tension and conflict and heighten the danger of nuclear war. Despite the fact that the book was published in 1981, it is still of interest as an example of the more conservative political views of a fairly large group of U.S. policymakers. The futile attempts to gain military superiority over the USSR are the tragic result of these views.

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BOOK ABOUT U.S. PUBLIC OPINION POLLS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 83 (signed to press 22 Aug 83) pp 104-105

[Review by A. A. Arzumanov of book "SShA. Politika skvoz' prizmu oprosov" [United States. Politics Viewed Through the Prism of Polls] by M. M. Petrovskaya, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1982, 270 pages]

[Text] In this examination of the origins and development of public opinion polls in the United States, M. M. Petrovskaya writes that "the institution of polls, which began as a journalistic practice and was then used widely in domestic market analysis, now serves the political needs of various segments of the U.S. dominant class as much as it serves their economic needs." Polls have turned into a genuine industry, encompassing all facets of American life--economics, domestic and foreign policy and ideology (p 58).

The author analyzes the methods used by polling services in detail. "When questionnaires are compiled," she writes, "they frequently contain an initial premise with which the respondent must agree or disagree. The skillful wording of this premise," the author stresses, "can have an ideological thrust" (p 29).

The activities of the main polling organizations, such as the Gallup Institute and the Harris Service, as well as several private services, are described in detail in the book.

M. M. Petrovskaya directs attention to the U.S. political phenomenon of the increased importance of campaign pollsters in recent years. Many of the people who organize campaign polls, she writes, have ceased to be mere advisers and have become political consultants who organize and often manage the campaigns of political figures. Through their skillful manipulation of the voters, and sometimes of the politicians as well, they have grown into a new force in U.S. politics (p 113).

The author cites the results of polls conducted in the 1970's and early 1980's to conclusively refute the opinion, cultivated by the conservative press, that there was an obvious rightward shift in the views of the American public during this period. The author makes the correct statement that, despite the obvious increase in the activity of the heralds of conservatism and despite the birth of the so-called "New Right," U.S. public opinion in general is still markedly

multifaceted and contradictory. The Americans have many feelings and views which can serve as a basis of support for conservatives and for forces left of center. The assumption of power by rightwing forces headed by Ronald Reagan is more indicative of dissatisfaction with Carter Administration policy than of support for Ronald Reagan's rightwing views.

American imperialism is threatening the security of other countries and even the security of the American people. For this reason, the U.S. public has displayed an increasing interest in foreign policy and ruling circles have displayed an increased desire to learn the foreign policy views of Americans. The author's analysis of the results of polls in recent years, polls pertaining to the issues of war and peace, the arms race, U.S.-Soviet relations, detente and arms reduction, can be used as a guide in tracing the evolution of American attitudes toward these issues, the modification of views under the influence of various domestic and foreign policy moves by the administration and the effect of the myths spread by the mass media about the Soviet military threat and Soviet nuclear superiority. This section of the book will be of particular interest to the reader because it contains a detailed discussion of American public opinion with regard to the vitally important issues under the difficult conditions of economic and sociopolitical crisis in the United States.

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BOOK ABOUT 'BRAIN DRAIN' IN DEVELOPING WORLD REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 83 (signed to press 22 Aug 83) pp 105-106

[Review by A. S. Shelenkova of book "SShA: 'pokhishcheniye umov' v proshlom i nastoyashchem" (United States: "Brain Theft" in the Past and Present) by A. N. Shlepakov and L. A. Smirnova, Moscow, Mysl', 1983, 182 pages]

[Text] For more than two decades various U.S. services, agencies and monopolies have been "hunting" for minds and talents among foreign specialists in various countries, particularly in the developing world.

This overt intellectual poaching, which has turned into the most dangerous channel of the neocolonial exploitation of developing countries, could even be called "brain theft" instead of a drain. This serious problem is discussed in detail in the subject of this review, a study of U.S. immigration policy during the 200 years of the country's existence.

The authors present numerous documented facts to demonstrate the role played by foreign specialists in the development and growth of U.S. scientific and technical potential and in the establishment of American science and technology and reveal the scales and types of losses incurred by other countries as a result of the "brain drain."

The scales of this parasitical practice are quite impressive. Between 1949 and 1978, 284,400 highly skilled specialists entered the United States as immigrants, including 49,200 scientists in the natural sciences, around 11,000 in the social sciences, 134,800 engineers and 89,400 physicians. Immigration was particularly intensive after 1965, when 188,000 moved to the United States (p 70).

If the training of scientific personnel or engineers costs, according to the estimates of American experts, 36,000 dollars and the training of physicians costs 83,000 dollars, the United States saved almost 2 billion dollars just in 1971 and 1972 on the training of highly skilled specialists by recruiting "foreign minds." If we consider that the potential value of specialists with a higher education has been estimated at 20 times the cost of their training, the total potential "price" of the knowledge of those who moved to the United States from the developing countries between 1961 and 1972 was 33.9 billion dollars and the overall economic impact of employing immigrant specialists throughout their careers was 108.3 billion dollars (pp 134-135).

It would not be possible to calculate the exact amount of the losses incurred by young states as a result of the constantly rising number of emigrating skilled personnel. Bourgeois sociologists and economists naively assume that the "brain drain" is a mutually beneficial process. However, it would take 4,000 additional skilled engineering and technical specialists a year to ensure an economic growth rate of 4 percent in Nigeria. As a result of emigration, the country is losing 2,000 people a year. There is a shortage of skilled personnel in Trinidad and Tobago: In numerical terms the shortage in 1969-1973 was equivalent to 5,000 professional and managerial personnel, 3,000 technicians and 36,500 craftsmen. In the 1970's the shortage of specialists in the natural sciences and engineering reached 20,000 in Argentina. According to JEUNE AFRIQUE, several scientific research institutes could not be opened in Pakistan because the individuals who were supposed to be their administrators had emigrated (pp 148-149).

The emigration of medical personnel to the United States has a negative effect on the developing countries. It has been estimated that this "drain" signified the impossibility of offering medical treatment to around 40 million people just in 1971 and 1972 (p 158).

Scientists have noted with justification that the "brain drain" is not only diminishing the intellectual potential of the developing countries. It is also undermining their position in science and technology, intensifying their isolation from scientific discoveries in other countries, depriving them of opportunities to follow the development of world science, subordinating them to the interests of imperialist states and creating disparities.

All of this is being done deliberately by the American services and monopolies that are luring specialists to work for them. And these people are not merely qualified but also, and above all, are gifted and promising individuals with knowledge and experience. The United States has even resorted to legislative changes. A new law which was signed with a great deal of fanfare by the Statue of Liberty in 1965 shifted the emphasis from the nationality of the specialist to his qualifications. Young people who attend U.S. VUZes are solicited by recruiters. Therefore, the publicized personnel training programs for the developing countries, financed through budget allocations for foreign "aid," are actually an instrument for the appropriation of specialists.

As the researchers correctly point out, the desire to secure the superior intellectual potential of the capitalist world by means of intensive "brain transplants" is a typical symptom of the imperialist nature, which, as speakers pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, "always seeks advantages at the expense of others and imposes its own will."

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BOOK ABOUT CRISIS OF U.S. POLITICAL AUTHORITY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 83 (signed to press 22 Aug 83) pp 106-108

[Review by B. M. Bakuyev of book "SShA: Krizis politicheskoy vlasti" [United States: Crisis of Political Authority] by A. A. Kokoshin, Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1982, 190 pages]

[Text] This book is the latest in a series of well-received studies of signs of crisis in American politics by this author.

A. A. Kokoshin makes the accurate observation that the main causes of the crisis of political authority in the United States in the 1970's and 1980's were the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the declining effectiveness of administration social and economic policy, the Watergate scandal and the serious failures of U.S. foreign policy (p 110).

The constant intensification of this crisis, in the author's opinion, was the result of the deterioration of economic conditions in the country and of a series of cyclical and structural crises which made inflation and unemployment urgent economic, sociopsychological and political problems. In addition to this, almost all of the institutions and individual components of the contemporary American bourgeois political system (the presidency, Congress, the federal bureaucracy and the state and local governments) have intensified the contradictory aspects of administration policy--both domestic and foreign--by pursuing goals of their own. By the beginning of the 1980's, the author notes, presidential authority in the United States was the target of pointed criticism from the right and the left, and many of the economic and social theories of bourgeois scholars, which had served the dominant class for almost five decades, turned out to be absolutely groundless (p 181).

The development of signs of crisis in the country, the author notes, is contributing a great deal to the increasing unpopularity of the Reagan Administration's economic policy. Many prominent politicians and members of the business community have expressed doubts about the advisability and efficacy of the current administration's foreign economic line, and this has weakened the administration's position considerably. Opposition to the President's economic program is growing, and not only among the American people but also in Congress and among the governors of states and the mayors of cities. This was

particularly apparent during the discussions of the federal budget for fiscal year 1983. One target of criticism was the huge federal budget deficit due to the constant rise in military allocations, which were increased by another 18 percent in Reagan's draft budget for 1983 (p 152).

From the very beginning, the Reagan Administration has chosen an aggressive, provocative line in foreign policy, particularly in relations with the Soviet Union. Administration policy toward the developing countries has also been described as "unyielding" confrontation. More support is being given to the most aggressive regimes, including those on the verge of collapse as a result of revolutionary movements in their countries. More American pressure is being exerted on the NATO allies and Japan for a higher level of military preparations, which is endangering the stability of ally relations (p 125).

In the United States the President is the main figure in the planning and implementation of foreign policy, the author points out. The President has particularly extensive powers in the foreign policy sphere. He has the authority to put the U.S. armed forces in a state of combat readiness and to make decisions on the use of the huge nuclear arsenal. For this reason, American researchers, politicians and representatives of the general public who have doubts about the President's ability to display genuine wisdom and the necessary flexibility and realism in a complex international situation are understandably worried (p 156).

The U.S. dominant class has made persistent attempts in recent years to strengthen the shaky foundations of various domestic political institutions and its weakened international position and thereby overcome the symptoms of crisis that became apparent in the last decade. The author cites examples of this from the sphere of domestic policy--the relaxation of several regulations with regard to private enterprise and the institution of stronger repressive practices, particularly with regard to the labor movement--and the foreign policy sphere--the more intensive propaganda of ideas undermining international stability, the spreading of lies about the Soviet Union and its international activity, the instigation of conflicts in various parts of the world to create excuses for intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, etc.

It is becoming increasingly difficult, however, to correct conflicts within the United States and conflicts with the allies now that the USSR and the entire socialist community are constantly acquiring more international influence, now that the national liberation movement is growing, now that progressive and democratic forces are more active in the developed capitalist countries and now that the United States is more dependent on the outside world (and consequently more vulnerable). American ruling circles recently encountered another development--an unprecedented movement against war and militarism, and not only in Western Europe but even in the United States itself. The struggle for the nuclear "freeze" is acquiring broader dimensions and will certainly discredit President Reagan's foreign policy line even more. Reality is confirming the main thesis of this interesting study: The crisis of political authority is constantly growing more acute, and imperialism is making feverish attempts to find a way out of this blind alley.

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL POTENTIAL: SOME QUESTIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 83 (signed to press 22 Aug 83) pp 119-127

[Article by V. I. Gromeka]

[Text] One of the characteristic features of the crisis of the world capitalist system is the maintenance of the unequal scientific and technical potential of the developed and developing countries making up this system and the simultaneous unequal growth of the potential of the developed capitalist countries, which is intensifying the inter-imperialist struggle and the struggle of the developing countries for economic independence.

An analysis of the data presented below, published by the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF),¹ is of particular interest as an assessment of the development dynamics of the scientific and technical potential of the United States, Western Europe and Japan and their relative positions in this field at the turn of the decade. It reflects the stronger positions of the monopolies of other countries in international markets at the expense of American firms, the U.S. desire to stop this process and its attempts to stabilize its position and regain its lost influence.²

It must be admitted that the data in this report reflect defects in the methods used to measure the scientific and technical potential of various countries. They provide a fairly complete picture of investments and expenditures on the development of science but only an indirect and far from complete picture of results and the return on these expenditures.

Expenditures on scientific research and development and the number of scientists and engineers are usually considered to be the main indicators of a country's level of scientific and technical development. Obviously, both of these indicators, particularly the first one, reflect the intensity of scientific and technical development. As for the effect of these factors on the actual dynamics of national scientific and technical potential, the dynamics also depend on such extremely important factors as the distribution of science expenditures among military and civilian projects and among various stages of R & D, the effectiveness of scientists' labor, the scales of government regulation, etc.

Scientific and Technical Personnel

In the majority of capitalist countries, statistics of the total number of engineers and scientists are fairly involved. Data on scientific personnel and engineers engaged directly in R & D exist, but, as Table 1 shows, they take a long time to publish.

Table 1

Total Number of Scientific Personnel and Engineers Engaged
in R & D, thousands

Countries	1965	1970	1975	1977	1977 in relation to 1965*
France	42.8	58.5	65.3	68.0	1.59
FRG	61.0	82.5	103.9	111.0	1.82
Japan	117.6	172.0	255.2	272.0	2.31
England	49.9	--	80.7	--	1.62
United States	494.5	546.5	534.9	573.9	1.16

* For England, 1975 in relation to 1965.

"Science Indicators 1980," Appendix table 1-1, p 208.

The number of scientific personnel and engineers engaged in R & D in the United States was 645,000 at the end of the 1970's, which was slightly higher than the combined indicator for France, the FRG, Japan and England. The difference is negligible, however, although it was around 80 percent in 1965. The gap is being closed by the quicker increase in the number of scientific and engineering personnel engaged in R & D in Japan and Western Europe. Between 1965 and 1977 their number rose 16 percent in the United States, 131 percent in Japan, 82 percent in the FRG, 62 percent in England and 59 percent in France.

Something else is also interesting. The United States was the only capitalist state where the number of engineers and scientists engaged in R & D did not rise steadily during this period: After reaching 555,000 in 1969, it dropped to 518,000 in 1972-1973 and started to rise again only in 1974. In the late 1960's and early 1970's there was unemployment among scientists and engineers--an extraordinary phenomenon in the American labor market. Although the rate of unemployment among engineers and scientific personnel dropped to 1.5 percent in 1979, it was around 4 percent among VUZ graduates between the ages of 20 and 24.³

In 1978, 2,473,000 scientific personnel and engineers were employed in the United States and 85 percent of them were working in their specialty.⁴ Around 278,000 were engaged directly in research, 407,000 were working on development projects and 228,000 were R & D administrators,⁵ accounting for around 37 percent of all the employed scientists and engineers. The next largest groups were working in other fields: in administration (16 percent), teaching (9 percent), etc.

Another general indicator of scientific and technical potential is connected with the ratio of scientific personnel and engineers engaged in R & D to the total number employed (see Table 2).

Table 2

Number of Scientific Personnel and Engineers Engaged in R & D
per 10,000 Employed Individuals

<u>Countries</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1977</u>
France	21.0	27.3	29.3	30.3
FRG	22.7	30.9	41.0	44.3
Japan	24.6	33.4	47.9	49.9
England	19.6	--	31.3	--
United States	64.1	63.6	56.4	57.7

"Science Indicators 1980," Appendix table 1-1, p 208.

Table 2 shows that the United States was the only major capitalist power where the indicator declined after 1965. More complete data would show us that it reached its peak in 1968, when it was 66.9, reached its nadir in 1974--56.3--and rose to 60.4 in 1980, without coming up to the level of 1968 or 1965. The rise of this indicator was particularly rapid in Japan and the FRG, just as in the case of the total number of scientists and engineers engaged in R & D.

Forecasts for the next few years predict (according to the calculations of the Bureau of Labor Statistics) an approximate balance in the demand and supply of engineers in the mid-1980's. Supply will exceed demand in the case of scientific personnel. According to current estimates, in the mid-1980's from 60,000 to 80,000 scientists and engineers will have to look for jobs outside the sphere of science and technology or in so-called "nontraditional" fields--that is, not in their specialty. Employment opportunities should be particularly favorable for geologists and geophysicists and for economists outside the academic sphere, but the supply of sociologists and members of some other professions will exceed the demand for them.⁶

As mentioned above, when quantitative indicators of scientific and technical potential connected with the number of people engaged in R & D are being assessed, other factors must also be taken into account, such as the technical equipment level of scientific institutes and establishments, the qualifications of scientists and engineers, their degree of motivation to work more productively, etc. Many of these indicators can be measured in quantitative terms, but this does not clarify their final contribution to the scientific and technical development of a country in comparison to other growth factors. For example, the indicator of the growth of qualifications of people engaged in R & D is the percentage with a doctorate. This indicator rose from 10 percent in 1974 to 13 percent in 1978 (although there could be many reasons for this change).⁷ The NSF doctoral program was canceled by the Reagan Administration and then restored on a smaller scale in response to the "protests" of NSF experts and the criticism of industry spokesmen.

The contribution of university scholars to the development of scientific and technical potential is influenced greatly by the distribution of time among

various functions. In recent years, judging by various American sources, more and more of their time is consumed not by research as such, but by applications for research grants, various meetings and so forth (10-30 percent of their work time) and only 24 percent is spent on research.⁸ The administrative work of scientists is undergoing an unavoidable increase as a result of rising requirements with regard to requisition procedures, economic and biological safety precautions, etc.

Women account for only 9.7 percent of the scientists and engineers employed in scientific fields, although they represent 41 percent of the total number employed.

R & D Expenditures

Another important indicator of the development of scientific and technical potential is the amount spent on R & D.

Table 3

Total R & D Expenditures of Leading Capitalist Countries, % of GNP,
in 1961-1978

<u>Years</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>England</u>	<u>USA</u>
1961	1.38	1.25*	1.39	2.46	2.73
1965	2.01	1.73	1.54	--	2.89
1970	1.91	2.18	1.79	2.22**	2.63
1975	1.80	2.38	1.94	2.05	2.27
1978	1.76	2.37	1.93	2.11	2.23

* 1962.

** 1969.

"Science Indicators 1980," Appendix table 1-3, p 210.

In 1967 U.S. expenditures in this area were around 23 billion dollars, as compared to the 9 billion dollars spent by France, the FRG and Japan combined. At the end of the 1970's the gap between the United States and these three countries was reduced sharply, and the respective figures in 1978 were 48 billion and 46.3 billion.⁹

These data can be even more indicative if they take national economic scales and the rate of inflation into account. This is the indicator of the ratio of R & D expenditures to the gross national product (GNP).

The current level of government and private R & D financing is 69 billion dollars in the United States, equivalent to 35 billion in 1972 prices. Industry accounts for 70 percent of all expenditures in this area.¹⁰

The data in Table 3 testify that the percentage of the GNP spent on R & D in the United States decreased constantly after 1965 and did not rise again (according to preliminary estimates) until 1979. In 1981 it was expected to reach 2.37, which is much lower than the level of the early 1960's (the peak in 1964 was 2.96 percent).

This indicator remained relatively stable during the 1970's only in the FRG and Japan. After this it remained almost static in virtually all of the large developed capitalist countries.

The level of R & D militarization introduces significant differences into the dynamics of this indicator. In terms of this level, the United States is far ahead of the other capitalist countries.

The arrival of the Republican administration signified further and even more dramatic intensification of the militarization of U.S. economic, scientific and technical development. In 1981, the first year of Reagan's term in office, expenditures on military R & D rose 23 percent, while the rate of increase was 7 percent for space R & D and 1 percent for civilian R & D projects. If inflation is taken into account, this means that the rate of increase for military R & D was 13 percent, while there was an absolute decrease in funds for space and civilian projects.¹¹ Furthermore, expenditures connected with the militarization of space accounted for the growth of space R & D. So-called national defense--or, more precisely, arms race expansion--accounts for 52 percent of all government R & D expenditures. In 1981 the direct, officially recorded expenditures in this area amounted to 18 billion dollars. It is known that this figure does not include defense expenditures listed under other budget items.

The growth of R & D equipment purchases has never been steady. This reflects the fundamental goals Washington sets for science. For example, the dramatic growth of expenditures on scientific equipment in the beginning of the 1960's reflected the increased activity of NASA. After 1972 expenditures on power engineering equipment rose quickly, particularly in connection with research projects in the areas of thermonuclear energy and high-energy physics and the space shuttle program. The federal government accounts for 30 percent of the expenditures on new equipment; universities need to re-equip their laboratories, but Washington's obligations in this sphere have been decreasing for a number of years (in constant prices).

The extremely important indicators cited above--the number of scientific personnel and engineers engaged in R & D and expenditures on science--are the main indicators of the development of scientific and technical potential. To a considerable extent, they also reflect its development dynamics. Experts from the NSF include data on patents, the volume of scientific literature, dynamics of labor productivity and some others among the indicators for the quantitative measurement of the impact of scientific work and expenditures on science.

Patents and Literature

When patent statistics are analyzed, it is extremely important to examine not only and even not so much the total number of patents issued in the United States

as the number of patents issued to American corporations and citizens as compared to the number issued to foreigners and foreign corporations.

Table 4

Number of Patents Issued in Some Countries, Including the United States, in 1966-1979

<u>Countries</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
Total	78,316	71,998	66,079	48,852
United States	55,976	46,708	41,233	30,069
FRG	5,519	6,035	5,849	4,528
Japan	4,032	6,352	6,911	5,252
England	3,468	3,043	2,722	1,910
Switzerland	1,281	1,457	1,329	1,025

"Science Indicators 1980," Appendix table 1-15, p 225.

The total number of patents issued in the United States decreased by 38 percent between 1971 and 1979. During this time the number of patents to American companies and citizens decreased by 46 percent and the number issued to foreign corporations and citizens increased by 16 percent (but the number of patents issued to foreigners decreased for all other countries but Japan). In 1971, when the total number of patents issued in the United States to foreigners reached 22,340, Japan accounted for 18 percent, and the figure in 1979 was around 28 percent--that is, Japan's share increased more than 1.5-fold. Most of the patents received by Japan were in technically advanced industries: chemical production, computers, electronics, communications, production instruments and scientific equipment.¹²

Between 1971 and 1977 the number of patents issued in Japan to its own citizens and companies increased 1.7-fold and the number issued to foreigners decreased by 25 percent; in the FRG the indicators rose 30 percent and 10 percent respectively. In England and France both indicators decreased dramatically.¹³

Now let us look at data on scientific literature. To derive an indicator of the impact of R & D expenditures, the NSF chose a method suggested by prominent American scientific expert D. de Solla Price in the beginning of the 1960's, based on the calculation of articles and references in the most prestigious scientific publications.¹⁴

NSF researchers analyzed more than 2,100 of the most frequently cited and prestigious magazines¹⁵ and calculated the percentage of articles by American scientists and the frequency of references to their works. If we look at all eight of the fields examined by the NSF, the proportion accounted for by publications by American authors in the total number of articles in the world's most prestigious scientific journals between 1973 and 1979 decreased from 39 percent to 37 percent in seven of these fields combined, excluding biomedicine. The most significant decrease was in mathematics--from 48 to

40 percent. The percentage of American articles in these magazines varied significantly from one field to another: from 40-45 percent in biology, biomedicine, clinical medicine, earth and space sciences, engineering, technology and mathematics to 30 percent in physics and 21 percent in chemistry.¹⁶ Leaving aside the question of the value of this indicator as an assessment of the results of scientific expenditures, we must say that there were no dramatic changes in this indicator in the United States throughout the 1970's.

When the NSF experts analyzed the indicator of references to American authors, they noted that American science still enjoys great prestige in the world, and the data cited in the report indicate no significant changes in the frequency of references to American authors during the 1970's.¹⁷

If indicators of patent statistics and indicators of scientific literature are thoroughly evaluated as a measurement of the results of R & D expenditures, their defects become obvious and are often admitted even in American literature.

In the case of patents, it should be noted, first of all, that their actual value--that is, the future commercial prospects of patented inventions--can differ widely. In the second place, inventions are sometimes patented only to keep a rival from using them. Furthermore (this is particularly true of technological improvements in contrast to new products), many inventions--sometimes even major breakthroughs--are often not patented so that they will not attract the attention of competitors. According to the president of one large and technically advanced American corporation, "for us patents are mainly evidence of past accomplishments."¹⁸ In other words, the most valuable new inventions are not patented, but are used only in the corporate interest, often as a means of deriving high monopoly profits. This involves a risk, but many corporations are prepared to take it.

It is particularly significant that although patents are sometimes used to analyze innovative activity in general, they usually serve only as indicators--and far from complete ones--of invention activity, or, in other words, the first stage of innovation. The progression from invention to innovation--that is, to commercial use--requires substantial material expenditures, human resources and time. Only a few of the tens of thousands of patents are issued for inventions which become major, commercially successful innovations. Furthermore, it is known that it is precisely these inventions and, in particular, the scales of their distribution or diffusion in the economy that make a tangible contribution to the development and reinforcement of scientific and technical potential. It is during the stage of diffusion that there is a return on R & D expenditures: New products are developed; the market for the new product is analyzed and taken over; production costs drop as a result of improvements in existing technological processes or the incorporation of new ones.

Even statistics pertaining to innovation, however, may aid in the assessment of the formation and development of scientific and technical potential but they do not measure the exact level of its development.

On the whole, it is clear that data on publications are an extremely relative reflection of the results of R & D expenditures. The number of publications says nothing about the quality or importance of the scientific ideas they contain. References to articles can also be made for the purpose of criticism. The most important thing is that these scientific ideas are even further removed from real innovation and the real process of the formation of scientific and technical potential than inventions, patented or unpatented.

Labor Productivity

Although one of the abovementioned indicators of the deceleration of technical progress, namely the decrease in the number of patents issued in the United States in the 1970's to American citizens, is mentioned frequently in scientific literature, the lower growth rate of labor productivity is another frequently cited but more significant indicator of this deceleration.

The dramatic decrease in U.S. labor productivity growth rates in the 1970's and the decline of the U.S. level in comparison to other countries are indisputable facts in themselves.

In the 1960's the labor productivity growth rate was much higher than in the 1970's in all of the main developed capitalist countries. In the 1970's France, the FRG and, in particular, Japan were far ahead of the United States in terms of this indicator. Labor productivity in the U.S. processing industry rose 28 percent over the 1970's, while the figure was 102 percent in Japan and 60 percent in France and the FRG. As a result of these higher rates, France and the FRG reduced the gap from around 55 percent in 1960 to almost 90 percent in 1980, and the respective figures for Japan were 24 and 70 percent. In spite of this, however, France and the FRG were still 10 percent below the U.S. level and Japan was 30 percent below this level in terms of labor productivity throughout the economy.

Table 5

Dynamics of Labor Productivity, Calculated per Worker in Processing Industry in Some Developed Capitalist Countries in 1960-80, %

<u>Years</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>England</u>
1960	100	100	100	100	100
1965	124	129	138	151	120
1970	132	176	171	280	143
1975	156	221	223	387	170
1980*	169	283	274	565	179
1980 in relation to 1970	128	161	160	202	125

* Preliminary data.

Calculated according to "Science Indicators 1980," Appendix table 1-10, p 220.

The reduction of absolute amounts of R & D expenditures in the 1970's played an indisputable role in the reduction of labor productivity growth rates. American researchers have had much to say about this, but it is also important to consider other factors contributing to the declining economic effectiveness of scientific and technical progress.

An examination of labor productivity dynamics points up one obvious fact. Japan and the FRG have the lowest military R & D expenditures. These are also the countries with the greatest increase in labor productivity and export volumes, particularly in the case of products requiring high scientific input. Although defense and space R & D expenditures influence economic development, this is not their direct purpose. Civilian R & D projects are another matter because economic and social development is their direct purpose, although certainly also with the aim of deriving profits with the aid of the capitalist market mechanism.

Table 6

Real Gross Domestic Product per Worker in Some Developed Capitalist Countries in 1960-1980

Countries	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980*
United States	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
France	54.2	60.2	71.1	81.0	89.4
FRG	56.6	60.1	71.3	78.6	88.7
Japan	24.1	31.3	48.7	57.2	68.4
England	54.5	52.5	57.6	57.1	60.5

* Preliminary data.

"Science Indicators 1980," Appendix table 1-11, p 221.

The effectiveness of scientific and technical expenditures must be analyzed with consideration for the following. As E. Mansfield, one of the most prominent American experts on scientific and technical progress, has stressed, there are many technical innovations which do not require preliminary R & D expenditures. For this reason and others, there is no direct connection between the number of innovations and the scales of R & D expenditures. According to NSF data, for example, the United States accounted for around 80 percent of all major innovations in 1953-1958, around 67 percent in 1959-1964 and around 57 percent in 1965-1973. In our opinion, this indicator provides more accurate information about the level and dynamics of national scientific and technical potential than the indicators mentioned earlier.

It is even more important to consider the fact that R & D expenditures represent only part of the expenditures on innovations: According to some estimates, they represent only 20 percent of all expenditures, including the cost of equipment, buildings, etc., and according to other estimates they represent around 40-50 percent of the total cost in such highly technical industries as chemicals, machine building and electronics.¹⁹

Table 7

Capital Investments in Processing Industry of Some Capitalist Countries
in 1960-1978, % of Production Volume

<u>Years</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>England</u>
1960-1969	8.8	29.9	16.3	13.4
1970-1978	9.7	26.5	15.2	13.7
1960-1978	9.2	28.8	15.9	13.5

"Science Indicators 1980," Table 1-3, p 15.

In other words, if R & D results are to have a real impact on production effectiveness, they must (with the exception of some administrative innovations) take the form of new equipment, machine tools and so forth, and this requires sizeable capital investments.

Table 7 shows that the level of capital investments in relation to output in the U.S. processing industry has been one-third as high as in Japan and just about half as high as in the FRG for the last 20 years.

If labor productivity growth dynamics are compared to indicators of R & D expenditures and capital investments, the latter will correlate more precisely with labor productivity dynamics than R & D expenditures.

If, however, data on labor productivity and its dynamics are to be used as an indicator of the level and development rate of scientific and technical potential (just as in the assessment of technological progress as a major factor of economic growth and its impact on the decisive indicator of this growth--labor productivity), the effect of many other factors on economic development and labor productivity growth must also be taken into account.

Renowned American economist Z. Griliches conducted a study to learn whether R & D projects were the "main culprit" in the reduction of U.S. labor productivity growth rates and found that this deceleration was not merely a result of deceleration in the R & D sphere. According to his calculations, this factor was responsible for only an 0.1 percent decline in labor productivity growth.²⁰

It is true that a decrease in R & D expenditures for several years even in absolute terms cannot nullify the fact that the United States is still ahead of almost all the capitalist countries in terms of the ratio of R & D expenditures to the GNP. To a considerable extent, this is also true of expenditures on the incorporation of R & D results and on the diffusion of innovations.

We feel there is reason to believe that the lower growth rates of U.S. economic development and labor productivity are due primarily not to so-called innovative stagnation (a shortage of innovations and their slower diffusion), about which so much has been said and written in America, but the effect of other

factors on the economy, which were reflected in the 1970's in the dramatic exacerbation of old conflicts and the appearance of new contradictions of contemporary capitalism.

In connection with this, the decisive effect of U.S. economic development on scientific and technical progress during some periods must be taken into account. There is every reason to believe that innovative stagnation is proof of the negative effect of the increasing instability of the American economy on scientific and technical progress.

It is indicative that some representatives of bourgeois economic science have even acknowledged this fact.²¹

Therefore, labor productivity statistics testify that, in the first place, the "technology gap" between the United States and Western Europe has been reduced considerably over the last 20 years; secondly, there is reason to believe that the lower growth rates of U.S. labor productivity are not only and not so much the result of "innovative stagnation" as of other factors connected with the exacerbation of old contradictions of capitalism and the appearance of new ones; thirdly, the United States still has the highest level of labor productivity in the economy as a whole and in the processing industry in particular; fourthly, it will strive to regain its previous strong position or at least retain its present economic and political position. Here, however, another factor must be taken into account.

The correlation between various levels of research--fundamental and applied--is quite important in the analysis of national scientific potential. Basic research began to grow in the United States in the mid-1970's and is still growing, although the rate of growth was lower in 1980-1981 (in constant prices). This growth has been measured at 5.6 percent a year (1968-1978) and is financed primarily by the federal government. In 1981 university science, which accounts for approximately half of this research in the country, had to expand its work front by 13 percent in comparison to 1975. Unless serious projects are in progress, it will become increasingly difficult for U.S. industry to keep up with its rivals.

Prospects

The dramatic exacerbation of contradictions in economic and social development, the increasing militarization of the economy, the ineffectiveness of state-monopoly regulation and other factors are seriously complicating forecasts of the scientific and technical development of the main capitalist power.

It is obvious that the United States will continue to be the leader in science and technology in the capitalist world in the next decade, although the technology gap will continue to shrink. This will lead unavoidably to the further exacerbation of conflicts between developed capitalist countries in the scientific, technical, economic and political spheres.

The struggle will be fought primarily in such spheres as the production and use of microprocessors, robot engineering and biotechnology and in the

development of new materials and computer technology. The United States is the leader in the majority of these areas, with the exception of robot engineering and the practical use of advanced automated production systems. American experts have admitted that Japan has made major breakthroughs in the use of this equipment (just as in the production of much earlier tools with programmed control) and has left the United States far behind. It is a well-known fact that Japan is making energetic use of its advantage in the production of such goods as motor vehicles and household electronics and has flooded the American market with products, particularly since the middle of the 1970's. In the case of robot engineering and flexible automation, America is already being challenged in this important field of technical progress. When the prospects for U.S. scientific and technical competition with Japan and other capitalist countries are being assessed, the constant changes in the makeup of new scientific and technical fields and advanced branches of science and technology must also be borne in mind.²²

Something else must not be ignored. Many American scientists who assess U.S. scientific potential have noted that the United States, in contrast to other capitalist countries, does not have the necessary nationwide plan or even an efficient coordinating system for the intensive development of science. The Reagan Administration is preserving the status quo in all respects.

The development of U.S. science and technology and the effect of this on the economy and society will be influenced considerably by the exacerbation of domestic political and economic conflicts. The ultimate goal of scientific and technical progress in the United States--preparations for a nuclear world war or peaceful and constructive development--will be of particular significance in this respect. This is a matter of concern to more than just the American public.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Science Indicators 1980," Wash., 1981. The NSF prepared and published the first report of this kind in 1973 and now publishes one every other year. This one is the fifth. Like previous reports, it concentrates on quantitative indicators of U.S. scientific development. Nevertheless, there are frequent comparisons with Western Europe and Japan.
2. V. M. Kudrov, "Three Centers of Imperialism. The Changing Balance of Power," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, Nos 9-10.
3. "Science Indicators 1980," p 149. It must also be borne in mind that many engineers and scientists are not working in their special fields.
4. Ibid., Appendix table 5-2, p 299.
5. Ibid., Appendix table 5-9, pp 305-306. Data on the number of people engaged in R & D do not coincide with previously cited figures because different methods of calculation were used (surveys and so forth).

6. Ibid., pp 145-147.
7. Ibid., p 131.
8. Ibid., pp 72, 83.
9. Ibid., p 7.
10. Ibid., pp 52, 54.
11. Ibid., p 62.
12. Ibid., p 227.
13. Ibid., Appendix table 1-16, p 226.
14. D. de Solla Price, "Little Science, Big Science," N.Y., 1963.
15. Just in the natural and exact sciences.
16. "Science Indicators 1980," p 17.
17. Ibid., pp 17-18.
18. G. Rosseger, "The Economics of Production and Innovation," London-New York-Paris, 1980, p 190.
19. "Seminar on Research, Productivity and the National Economy, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 18 June 1980," p 27.
20. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, May 1980, pp 345-347.
21. See, for example, the article by R. Nelson in "International Economic Perspectives," Minneapolis (Minnesota), 1981. "This is a time of shock," he writes. "There are obviously many reasons for slower productivity growth, and these reasons are interrelated." One of the most important is "the restrictive administration policy stemming from worries about inflation.... It has been argued that there is a recession in technological progress itself, but there is no clear proof of this. It is clear, however, that economic stagnation is slowing down technical progress" (p 82). In conclusion, Nelson says that it is still not clear whether contemporary state-monopoly capitalism (which he calls a "semimarket, semisocialized" system) will be capable of ensuring technical progress or will have to give way to socialism (p 28).
22. A. A. Dynkin, "The Search for U.S. Scientific and Technical Strategy for the 1980's," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 4.

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